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Date of Degree : December, 2015 
 
Electronic messages have become the most popular, frequently-used and powerful medium 
for communications. However, everyone receives thousands of messages that require 
manual sorting into different folders. Moreover, one of the major issues and annoying 
problems in information security domain faced by end-users is receiving a large volume of 
unwanted messages, also known as spam. Nowadays, most messaging systems have built-
in filtering mechanisms that can block or quarantine unwanted messages based on 
predefined keywords. Over the years, some extensions for these filters have been proposed 
for improving their performance. However, spamming techniques have also continued to 
evolve and bypass existing countermeasures. Hence, new solutions and ideas must be 
explored. This thesis discusses the electronic mail classification and spam filtering 
problems. It reviews related issues and their impact. It also analyzes techniques used by 
spammers, and evaluates and compares the most common machine learning paradigms to 
classify emails and distinguish spam messages. Moreover, in this thesis, we explore a novel 
and promising methodology inspired by the danger theory of the human immune system to 
design hybrid approaches for constructing email classifiers and spam filters.  Additionally, 
we study a number of ways to extract and select more relevant features to reduce the 
complexity and improve the performance. The proposed method is evaluated on a number 
of benchmark datasets. The results demonstrate that the proposed method is a promising 
solution for textual email classification and spam filtering.  
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 ملخص الرسالة
 
 
 علي عبدالرزاق الحسن: املالاسم الك
 
 فيها بالبريد الاإ لكتروني وترش يح الرسائل غير المرغو  رسائلنماذج تنبؤ مس توحاة من نظام المناعة لتصنيف    عنوان الرسالة:
 
 علوم الحاسب التخصص:
 
 2015 ديسمبر: تاريخ الدرجة العلمية
 
 
تلقى اصل في وقتنا الحالي على المس توى الشخصي والرسمي. وي تعد الرسائل الاإ لكترونية من الوسائل المنتشرة والفعالة للتو 
ي لا طائل منها ا هائًلً من الرسائل التيدوًيا لمجلدات مختلفة، كما يتلقون كم   المس تخدمون كثيرًا من الرسائل التي تتطلب فرزاً 
ة التي تتطلب عناية خاص المهمة اأ منية . وتعد هذه القضية من القضايا)MAPS(أ و غير المرغوب فيها والتي تعرف بالبريد المزعج 
نه أ  من المس تخدمين ومديري الش بكات. ولذا تحتوي معظم أ نظمة الرسائل الاإ لكترونية على أ ليات للحد من هذه المشكلة. اإ لا 
 يلزم اس تحداث طرق لتوائم التطور في اأ  نظمة الحديثة. 
ا تقترح طرقًا لرسائل الاإ لكترونية النصية وترش يح غير المرغوب منها. كمتقوم هذه الدراسة بتحليل فعالية الحلول المتاحة لتصنيف ا
لاس تخلًص سمات أ كثر فعالية للتمييز بين الرسائل المختلفة. وعلًوة على ذلك، تقوم ببناء نماذج تصنيف مبنية على خوارزمية 
يانات ذات طرق أ خرى باس تخدام قواعد ب برنتها . كما تقوم بتحليل أ داء النماذج المقترحة ومقاالطبيعية مس توحاة من نظم المناعة
 وقد أ ظهرت النتائج فعالية الحل المقترح في تصنيف وترش يح الرسائل الاإ لكترونية النصية.خصائص مختلفة. 
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1 CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The Internet is playing a crucial role in our daily life. Electronic mail message service 
(email) is one of the earliest, most popular, and frequently used Internet applications that 
provides a powerful medium for personal and business communications. This is due to its 
flexibility, worldwide accessibility, relatively fast message transfer and low infrastructure 
costs. However, users receive large number of mail messages daily as shown in Table 1. 
For example, the number of sent and received emails in 2015 is over 205 billion. This 
number is expected to increase every year by 5%. The popularity of electronic email service 
has resulted in several security issues facing its users. Email spam is one of the major issues 
annoying end-users and causing various damages including financial loss to companies and 
law violation. Spam impacts an organizations’ and individuals’ network bandwidth, 
storage space, and system computational power. In addition, it wastes users’ time and 
productivity by requiring them to look through and sort a large volume of email messages, 
which is annoying and might violate their privacy. Spam may also advertise and broadcast 
prohibited material such as pornography content. Moreover, it might be a vector for other 
crimes or illegal activities such as gambling, fraud, ransom, and intimidation. 
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Table 1: Worldwide Daily Email Traffic per year [1] 
Daily Email Traffic 
Year 
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Total worldwide emails sent/received 
per day  
Numbers in billion 205.6 215.3 225.3 235.6 246.5 
Growth - 5% 5% 5% 5% 
Business emails sent/received per day  Numbers in billion 112.5 116.4 120.4 124.5 128.8 
Growth - 3% 3% 3% 3% 
Consumer emails sent/received per day  Numbers in billion 93.1 98.9 104.9 111.1 117.7 
Growth - 6% 6% 6% 6% 
 
There are various definitions for spam email and how it is different from legitimate (aka 
ham) email. Among the existing definitions, email spam is: “unsolicited, unwanted email 
that was sent indiscriminately, directly or indirectly, by a sender having no current 
relationship with the user” [2]. Identifying and filtering out these types of messages based 
on the sender information alone is hard. When the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) 
was designed, security was not a crucial issue. The mitigation solutions for spam email 
involve both non-technical and technical factors. The non-technical solutions involve 
human training and email policies. The technical solutions depend on deploying a 
multitude of anti-spammers and policy enforcement systems.  
According to McAfee Quarterly Threat report in 2015, the global spam volume increased 
every year (as shown in Figure 1) and much of the growth is driven by legitimate “affiliate” 
marketing firms using an untrustworthy list of brokers [3]. The risk of spam is very high 
as it may: waste computing resources, contain malicious attachments, market fraudulent 
products and services, and steal confidential information using phishing attacks techniques. 
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Figure 1: Global spam and email volume (trillions of messages per quarter) [3] 
 
Most of the spam is nowadays generated by automated tools which populate the user’s 
inbox with unsolicited junk messages; thus negatively impacts storage space, network 
traffic and system computational power. In addition, spam wastes users’ time and 
productivity as they need to check unnecessarily larger number of messages in the inbox 
and even other messages that were quarantined by deployed filters. Spam may also 
advertise and broadcast prohibited material such as pornography content as well as illegal 
or criminal information that is related to gambling, fraud, ransom, intimidation, illegal sale 
of guns, fake winning and/or ammunition. 
Spam email messages might contain malicious computer programs (such as viruses, 
Trojans, worms, or bots), which can harm the system and make it vulnerable to further 
attacks. For example, “ILoveYou”, Nimda, Melissa, and others were spread through spam. 
In February 2015, the global ratio of spam in email traffic was 54% [4]. According to [5], 
the financial losses caused by spam in 2009 were $130 billion.  These losses were 
calculated based on: user productivity cost (deleting spam, looking for false positives), 
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helpdesk cost (IT helping end users deal with spam), spam control software, hardware and 
services (licensing fees, amortized capital costs, etc.).  
A spam email message has some characteristics related to its content and traffic that can 
help in distinguishing it from a legitimate email messages. Figure 2 shows the structure of 
an email message and examples of content related features [6]. As shown, there are two 
main components: header and message body. The header is composed of a set of fields; 
each has a name, value and meaning. The body is mostly text in HTML format with 
graphical elements.  These characteristics and others such as email traffic can be used to 
filter an email. For example, spam arrival rate is more stable over time than for legitimate 
emails [7]. Most spammers hide their identities which come from small concentrated part 
of IP address space. Due to the significant technical differences between delivery methods, 
the spam problem is considered complex. There are many ways to filter out spam. For 
example, recognizing spam from legitimate email could be achieved by analyzing the 
contents and the method of delivery of the messages. Other approaches would utilize user’s 
personal judgment to define spam in addition to message content. Understanding the 
spamming tricks would definitely assist in developing adequate solutions to prevent and 
mitigate spam email. Due to this continuous evolution of the spamming techniques, 
systems for detecting and filtering spam have to be upgraded and new approaches need to 
be investigated. 
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Figure 2: Message structure and related features 
 
1.1 Email Basics 
An email message contains several elements that enable it to be transferred and routed from 
sender’s domain/inbox to recipient’s domain/inbox. Figure 3 depicts how two email servers 
are communicating and email is routed.    
 
Internet
User1@sender
domain.com
User2@receiver
domain.com
Local SMTP Server Remote SMTP Server
 
Figure 3: Standard email message process 
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An email message consists of two main parts: email header and email body. The email 
header is added into the email message automatically by the email server. The addition of 
the header is performed during email composition and transformation between systems  
[8]. It contains valuable information about the sender, mail system, and path taken to 
deliver the message. An illustrative example is shown in Figure 4. On the other hand, the 
body of the email message contains text and/or images as composed by the sender. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Example of email header (private information is replaced with X’s) 
  
Delivered-To: aXXXXXX@gmail.com 
Received: by 10.XX.XX.XX with SMTP id rXXcspXXX153XXXa; 
Sun, XX Mar 201X 19:33:22 -0700 (PDT) 
X-Received: by 10.XX.XX.XX with SMTP id g30mr62355933qkh.54.1427682800909; 
Sun, XX Mar 201X 19:33:20 -0700 (PDT) 
Return-Path: <XXXXXX@XXXXXXX.com> 
Received: from smtpX.XXXXXXX.com (smtpX.XXXXXXX.com. [174.XX.XX.XX]) 
by mx.google.com with ESMTP id l7XXXXX388XXXXXl.47.201X.0X.XX.XX.XX.XX 
for <aXXXXXXX@gmail.com>; 
Sun, XX Mar 201X 19:33:20 -0700 (PDT) 
Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of XXXXXXXX@XXXXXXXX.com designates 
174.XX.XX.XX as permitted sender) client-ip=174.XX.XX.XX; 
Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; 
spf=pass (google.com: domain of XXXXXXX@XXXXXX.com designates 174.XX.XX.XX as 
permitted sender) smtp.mail=XXXXX@XXXXXXXXXX.com; 
dkim=pass (test mode) header.XX=@XXXXXX.com; 
dmarc=pass (p=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=XXXXXXX.com 
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1.2 Thesis Objectives 
The main objectives of this research work are to: 
 Study the state-of-the-art techniques for text spam filtering including feature 
extraction and selection, and classification algorithms.    
 Gain understanding of the computational algorithms inspired by the immune-system 
with focus on the Dendritic Cell Algorithm (DCA). 
 Investigate and develop new models based on DCA to classify text emails and filter 
out spam messages. 
 Evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed models and their integration with other 
machine learning techniques and compare their performance with other approaches 
in the literature. 
 Study a number of ways to extract and select the most relevant features to reduce the 
complexity and enhance the performance. 
 
In this work, we consider only textual email messages. We have not considered embedded 
images or email traffic. 
 
1.3 Motivation 
As mentioned in the introduction section, spam messages are not only annoying and waste 
a lot of resources but they can also be a medium to distribute malicious codes and 
undermine the information security systems of an organization. With the improvement of 
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information security controls and measures, spammers have also improved their techniques 
in order to wage successful attacks. As shown in Figure 5, the required knowledge for 
hackers is getting steadily lower, yet they can launch more sophisticated attacks. Similar 
issue is facing anti-spam solutions. Although different spam filters and approaches have 
been developed, spammers are still finding ways to bypass them. This motivates the need 
to explore and develop new methodologies for adequate spam filtering. One of the 
approaches that have been recently proposed based on the danger theory of biological 
immune system is known as Dendritic Cell Algorithm (DCA). This approach has potential 
and natural characteristics that sound promising for mitigating the risk of spam. Moreover, 
it does not require high computing resources. Therefore, in this thesis we will design and 
evaluate a novel model based on DCA for email classification and filtering.   
 
 
Figure 5: Attack Sophistication vs. Intruder Technical Knowledge1 
                                                   
1 http://www.sei.cmu.edu/reports/02sr009.pdf 
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1.4 Thesis Organization 
In addition to this chapter, this thesis consists of four more chapters. In Chapter 2, we 
discuss literature review and background research about text mining and classification in 
general and spam filtering in particular including feature extraction, feature selection and 
classification algorithms. In addition, biological and artificial immune systems are 
explained with more focus on the biological dendritic cells and the dendritic cell algorithm.  
Chapter 3 explains our proposed methodology and architecture for message classification 
and spam filtering. In chapter 4, experimental works and used procedures are described in 
addition to giving an overview of the used datasets and evaluation measures. Chapter 5 
summarizes the thesis contributions and findings, and provides recommendation for future 
work. 
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2 CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Email Classification and Spam Filtering 
Document classification problem has been widely researched in databases, data mining, 
and information retrieval. This problem is defined in general as follows. There are a set of 
training records T = {X1, X2, …XN}, such that each record is labeled with a class value 
{1,2,…, k}, where k  2. It is required to construct a computational model that can be used 
to predict the class label for a given test instance with unknown class label. In our work, 
we consider two special cases: (a) k = 2 (spam filtering), (b) k > 2 (the more general multi-
category email classification problem). Figure 6 shows a typical spam filtering system. It 
consists of two main phases: 
1) Training phase (also known as offline phase): in this phase the machine learning 
algorithm is trained on a sample of the dataset (training set). The output of this phase is 
a model that can be used to predict and classify unseen data. There are several processes 
that must be performed to generate the classifier model. The main processes are: feature 
extraction, feature selection and learning algorithm. More about these processes will be 
discussed in the next section.  
2) Prediction phase (also called online or deployment phase): in this phase the system 
predicts and classifies a new email to either spam or non-spam using the model 
generated from the training phase. Some processes are needed similar to the processes 
that were used in the previous phase, i.e. feature extraction and feature selection. In this 
phase, user feedback can be utilized to enhance and adjust the classification model. 
11 
 
 
Figure 6: General layout of anti-spam system 
 
The upcoming subsections provide an overview of datasets, spam detection approaches, 
feature selections and extraction methods that are fed into the classification algorithms, and 
immune based algorithms.  
2.1.1 Datasets 
Evaluating the proposed approach on several datasets will help us to benchmark our model 
against other widely used classifiers. Also, the datasets are used to train and build the 
classifiers during the online phase.  However, collecting and obtaining the right datasets 
with enough number of messages is a challenging task. Due to privacy reasons, it is not 
easy to obtain non-spam (legitimate) emails. Moreover, mixing a dataset from different 
sources might lead to biased training of the classifier since the corpus distribution might 
12 
 
not reflect the real distribution. Therefore, it is recommended to obtain the collection from 
the same source that the filter will be trained on. Because of the privacy issue, some 
researchers have utilized either datasets that are not publicly accessible or a combination 
of private and public datasets in their research.  
In the literature, a number of spam corpora are available to the public for research purpose, 
e.g. Spambase, SpamAssassin, and LingSpam. Each dataset has specific features and 
characteristics including the number of users considered, compilation time, and general 
subject of the messages included. These datasets are available in different formats and have 
been used in several researches to evaluate various spam filtering techniques. Some of them 
are in raw format while others are preprocessed with a limited number of attributes. To 
protect end-users privacy some datasets have masked some terms. Table 2, Table 3, and 
Table 4 show examples of the widely used corpora for electronic messages.  
Spambase dataset2 has been widely tested in studies of general machine learning classifiers. 
It is a publicly accessible dataset in UCI Machine Learning Repository. This database was 
created at Hewlett-Packard Labs in 1999. It has 4601 emails; 1813 (39.4%) of them are 
spam. It is available in a preprocessed format where each email is described by 58 attributes 
(57 numeric attributes and a classification label, i.e. spam or non-spam). Most of the 
attributes indicate the occurrence frequency of a particular word or character in the e-mail. 
The first 48 attributes are of type word_freq_WORD and have real values in the range 
[0,100].  The next six attributes are of type char_freq_CHAR and have real values in the 
range [0,100]. Three attributes are of type capital_run_length_average, 
                                                   
2 https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Spambase 
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capital_run_length_longest and capital_run_length_total; they measure the average, 
maximum and total lengths of uninterrupted sequences of capital letters in the message.  
The last attribute denotes whether the e-mail was considered spam (1) or not (0). There 
was no further information provided about the message because of end user privacy issue. 
LingSpam dataset3 was collected by a linguistic mailing list in 2000. It contains 2893 
emails out of which 2,412 are non-spam email and 481 are abstracted versions of spam. 
The dataset creators used 10-fold stratified cross-validation to increase the confidence in 
their experimental findings. The header information was removed and subject line was 
kept. All words in the dataset were converted to lowercase. Markup and stop words were 
eliminated. Some words were substituted by their roots. Duplicated emails were removed 
from this corpora.   
SpamAssassin4 is a large collection of raw messages publicly available by SpamAssassin.   
The corpus includes complete messages including email header and body. This helps 
evaluate the impact of using header, body or subject alone on the classifier performance. 
For privacy reasons, some hostnames have been replaced with "spamassassin.taint.org" 
(which has a valid MX record). However, in most cases the messages appear exactly as 
they were received. The spam emails were collected from various sources such as mailing 
lists or emails reported to SpamAssassin team. This dataset was used during the 
development of practical spam filter solutions including SpamAssassin. This dataset is 
updated more often than other datasets and the last time it was updated in 2006. 
                                                   
3 http://www.aueb.gr/users/ion/publications.html 
4 http://spamassassin.org/publiccorpus 
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Enron5 has a large collection of non-spam messages. The emails were collected during the 
legal legislation of Enron Corporation. The email dataset was bought by MIT. The dataset 
was cleaned up by a research group at the Stanford Research Institute (SRI). Some 
messages have been deleted and attachments were removed. Invalid email addresses were 
converted to the form of user@enron.com. The dataset was originally made public, and 
posted to the web in 2003 by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission during its 
investigation. It contains data from more than 150 users, mostly senior management of 
Enron. The dataset directory structure is shown in Figure 7. Each user represents a 
subdirectory and each contains several sub-directories (representing the categories). 
  
 
Figure 7: Enron email directory structure 
 
PU123A6 Corpora contain personal and spam emails. They are available in preprocessed 
formats. Header fields and HTML tags were removed from the emails. However, subject 
                                                   
5 http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~enron/ 
6 http://www.aueb.gr/users/ion/publications.html 
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line has not been altered. The messages were converted to lowercase and strings of non-
alphabetic characters were replaced with a single white space. To protect end-user privacy, 
each token was mapped to a unique integer. There are four datasets in this collection, 
namely PU1, PU2, PU3 and PUA.  
Text REtrieval Conference (TREC) SPAM Track datasets (2005 – 2007)7 are the largest 
and most realistic datasets for evaluation. These corpora are publicly available on the web 
and can be downloaded by accepting the usage agreement.  The first corpus was created 
for the TREC spam evaluation track based on Enron corpus and spam messages collected 
in 2005. The emails were classified and augmented by additional spam emails from public 
sources. The emails were split into four groups. The second release of the corpus was in 
2006 and was in both English and Chinese.  The English data version was collected from 
the web and publicly available spam whereas the Chinese version was collected from a 
mailing list and augmented with spam from a honeypot. The third release was in 2007 and 
combined one private and one public datasets.  
ECML/PKDD8 2006 dataset is a pre-processed dataset that are transformed into  a bag-of-
words representation . During preprocessing of this corpus, terms with occurrence less than 
4 times were eliminated. For the preprocessing charset-, MIME-, base64-, URL- (RFC 
1738), and subject line-decoding (RFC 2047) were used. For privacy reasons, the terms 
were encoded to protect end users.  
ZH19 is a Chinese dataset gathered by the Neural Language Processing Lab at Northeastern 
University.  The messages were all simplified Chinese text encoded with GB2312/GBK. 
                                                   
7 http://trec.nist.gov/ 
8 http://www.ecmlpkdd2006.org/challenge.html 
9 http://homepages.inf.ed.ac.uk/lzhang10/spam/ 
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Since Chinese text is written continually without word delimitation, the text was segmented 
into words using a Chinese word segmenter developed at Northeastern University.  After 
that, the messages were preprocessed to tokenize header fields, message body, sender name 
and recipient name.  
GenSpam10 was gathered to overcome the problem of imbalance in number of spam and 
non-spam messages. The author collected the non-spam emails from 15 of his friends and 
colleagues. These emails are personal and commercial in nature. There are about 154k 
tokens in legitimate emails. The spam emails were sourced from sections 10-29 of the 
spamarchive collection, along with a batch gathered by the dataset author. The number of 
tokens in spam messages is about 281k tokens. The dataset was divided into training, 
validation and testing.  
                                                   
10 http://www.benmedlock.co.uk/ 
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Table 2: Preprocessed spam email datasets  
                                                   
11 https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Spambase 
12 http://www.aueb.gr/users/ion/publications.html 
13 http://www.ecmlpkdd2006.org/challenge.html 
14 http://www.benmedlock.co.uk/ 
Dataset Description 
Dataset size (number of messages) Related 
references 
Creation Year 
Headers 
included 
Encrypted Categories 
Spam Non-spam Total 
Spambase11 
Constructed as bag-of-
words that consists of 57 
features 
1,813 
(39.4%) 
2,788 
(60.6%) 
4,601 
[6], [12]–
[19], [82] 
1999 No Yes Binary 
PU112 
For privacy each distinct 
word replaced by arbitrary 
integer. 
481 
(44%) 
618 
(56%) 
1,099 [20] 2000 No Yes Binary 
PU2 
142 
(20%) 
579 
(80%) 
721 [21] 2003 No Yes Binary 
PU3 
1,826 
(44%) 
2,313 
(56%) 
4,139 [21], [22] 2003 No Yes Binary 
PUA 
571 
(50%) 
571 
(50%) 
1,142 [21] 2003 No Yes Binary 
ECML-PKDD 
2006 13 
Messages represented as 
bag-of-words used for a 
competition 
3,500 
(50%) 
3,500 
(50%) 
7,000 [23], [24] 006 No Yes Binary 
GenSpam14 
Header information 
reformatted in XML 
32,332 
(78%) 
9,072 
(22%) 
41,404 [9] 2005 No No Binary 
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Table 3: Raw spam email datasets 
 
                                                   
15 http://www.aueb.gr/users/ion/publications.html 
16 http://spamassassin.org/publiccorpus 
17 http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~enron/ 
18 http://trec.nist.gov/ 
19 http://homepages.inf.ed.ac.uk/lzhang10/spam/ 
Dataset Description 
Dataset size (number of messages) Related 
references 
Creation 
Year 
Headers 
included 
Encrypted Categories 
Spam Non-spam Total 
LingSpam15 
Collected from a 
linguistics mailing list 
481 
(17%) 
2,412 
(83%) 
2,893 [25] 2000 No No Binary 
SpamAssassin16 
Messages come from 
several sources 
1,897 
(31%) 
4,150 
(69%) 
6,047 [20] 
2002 
(Updated  
2006) 
Yes No Binary 
Enron17 
Collected from about 
158 users, mostly 
senior management of 
Enron 
13,496 
(42%) 
16,545 
(58%) 
30,041 
[20] 
[26], [27] 
2003 Yes No 
Multiple/ 
Binary 
TREC 2005 
Available online 
through NIST18 and 
considered to be the 
largest dataset 
52,790 
(57%) 
39,399 
(43%) 
92,189 
[22], [28], 
[29] 
2005 Yes No Binary 
TREC 2006 
24,912 
(66%) 
12,910 
(34%) 
37,822 [30] 2006 Yes No Binary 
TREC 2007 
50,199 
(66%) 
25,220 
(34%) 
75,419 [31] 2007 Yes No Binary 
ZH1 19 Chinese corpus 
1,205 
(74%) 
428 
(26%) 
1,633 [32] 2004 Yes Yes Binary 
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Two other datasets are related to short messages. The first one is “SMS spam corpus v.0.1 
big” [10] (will be called SMS big in the rest of this thesis). This dataset is a collection of 
1002 legitimate message and 322 spam messages in English language. The legitimate 
SMSs were randomly extracted from the National University of Singapore (NUS) SMS 
Corpus and the Jon Stevenson Corpus. The spam messages were collected from the 
Grumbletext website. The average length of words per message is 4.44 characters long and 
the average number of words is 15.72 . The other dataset is SMS UCI Spam Collection 
[11]. It is available in at UCI machine learning repository in a raw data format. This dataset 
is in English. It was collected in 2012 from four main sources:  Grumbletext website (425 
SMS), Caroline Tag's PhD Theses (450 SMS), National University of Singapore (3,375 
SMS) and Jon Stevenson Corpus (1,324 SMS). It is considered the largest SMS spam 
corpus publicly available. 
 
Table 4: Spam SMS datasets 
Dataset 
Dataset size  
(number of messages) Creation date 
Tokens 
per 
message 
Related 
references 
Spam Non-spam Total 
SMS Big 322 1,002 1,423 2007 15.72 
[10], [33], 
[34] 
UCI SMS Spam  747 4,827 5,574 2011 14.56 [10] 
 
 
 
 
20 
 
2.1.2 Feature Extraction 
Bag-of-words (BoW) scheme is the most widely used approach model for feature 
extraction because of its simplicity for classification purposes [38]-[40]. Each e-mail 
message is represented by a vector using vector space model (VSM). The vector could be 
represented as X = (x1, x2, x3…, xm), where m is the number of features (attributes). In the 
BoW approach, a vector could be created using different schemes as shown in Table 5.  
Each attribute will be given a weight to measure its importance to the document. A weight 
can be assigned to each attribute based on the occurrence of the term or existence of it. In 
the binary feature weight scheme, each element or attribute is either 1 or 0 depending on 
existence of the word or the feature. Term frequency (TF) scheme is also used to assign a 
weight to each attribute. In this approach the weight is assigned based on the number of 
occurrence of each term in the document. Sometime this weight is normalized by dividing 
the total number of terms in the documents. The normalization is performed because most 
of the time the processed documents are not of the same length.  The third most widely 
used approach is TF-IDF (term frequency-inverse document frequency). In this scheme, 
each element represents the term frequency times a global parameter representing the 
inverse of the document frequency. 
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Table 5: Bag of word vector creation 
Attributes Description 
Binary Term Occurrence (BTO) Xi,j= 1 if term exists 0 otherwise 
Term Frequency (TF) 
,
,
, j
     
i j
i j
k
K
TF
X
TF


 
Term Frequency–Invers Document  
Frequency (TF-IDF) 
, ,
| |
.log
|{ : }|
   i j i j
j i j
D
X TF
d t d


 
where |D| is the number of documents in the corpus 
and dj is a specific document. 
Term Occurrence (TO) 
vi,j=fi,j 
The absolute number of occurrence of a term  
 
Another approach combines internal and external information features [35]. In this 
approach, some features are extracted from the email itself such as the number of dots in  
URL links embedded in the message body. Other features are extracted from external 
information such as the age of “linked-to” domain names. In [36], structural features are 
used for detecting phishing emails. This approach includes features from style markers and 
structure attributes such as the structure of the subject line and greetings in the message 
body. Hybrid feature selection that combines behavior based and content based was 
proposed in [37]. An example of the features considered in this approach is analyzing the 
message-ID tag and sender email. 
Table 6 is a summary of the main spam feature extraction methods. It also shows the 
datasets and algorithms that were used in addition to some performance results.  
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Table 6: Spam feature extraction 
Type of Feature 
Related 
references 
Dataset Preprocessing Classifier 
Experiment 
results 
Remarks 
BoW TF-IDF 
[38] TREC - SVM AUC  = 99.07% 
Fuse information of words in an email by using 
TF-IDF formula 
[39] 
SpamAssassin 
and a specially 
created 
repository 
Stemming and 
stopping 
KNN, SVM, NB 
Accuracy above 
90% 
 
[40] 
Two specially 
created 
repositories 
- RIPPER, SVM 
Error rate reach 
to 1.8% 
1000 best features and another data set where the 
dimensionality was over 7000 
Semantic 
Ontology 
concept by 
(TFV) method 
[41] Enron-spam 
Eliminate HTML 
tags, and 
stemming 
NB 
Spam F-measure 
is 94.87 % 
Level of accuracy is low compared with other 
techniques; Proposed model works in 5 steps 
Internal and 
external 
information 
[35] SpamAssassin - 
Random forest, 
SVM 
False positive 
rate = 0.12% 
10 features include WHOIS query 
Structural 
features 
[36] 
A specially 
created 
repository 
Remove all the 
blank lines 
SVM 
Accuracy  reach 
to 100% 
Features relevant to language, composition and 
writing 
Online and 
offline features 
[42] TREC - SVM 
Accuracy  reach 
to 97% 
16 features. Requires higher cost computation  
because of online features 
Hybrid [37] SpamAssassin - 
Bayes Net 
algorithms 
Accuracy  reach 
to 96% 
Content-based and behavior-based. 
Using 7 features 
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2.1.3 Feature Selection Methods 
In this stage, the objective is to identify the features that are related to each class. Some 
features are correlated with the class label while others are irrelevant hence identifying the 
right features is important. Moreover, it is better to reduce the feature space dimensionality 
to avoid the over-fitting problem. Additionally, some classifiers cannot handle large 
number of features and their performance would be improved if only the right features are 
used. Figure 8 shows the original and reduced feature vectors. Reducing the feature space 
could be achieved using different methods such as stop-word removal, stemming, and 
feature selection techniques. In stop words removal, we determine common words (e.g. 
“the”, “and”) that are irrelevant to different classes. In stemming, the word is converted to 
its base form where suffixes and prefixes are trimmed. This is helpfully to avoid treating 
different forms of the same word and different attributes. For example, singular, plural and 
different tenses are converted to its stem form such as “moved” and “moving” are stemmed 
to “mov”. Porter stemming algorithm20 is the most widely used stemming algorithm and it 
became the de facto standard algorithm for English language stemming [47]. For the 
feature selection techniques, there are three main categories: filter, wrapper, and embedded 
based methods. 
                                                   
20 http://tartarus.org/~martin/PorterStemmer/index.html 
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Figure 8: Feature Selection Process 
 
2.1.4 Filter Feature Selection 
In the filter feature selection approach, there are two basic components in the model feature 
search and feature selection criteria/evaluation as shown in Figure 9.  Information gain 
(IG), mutual information (MI), gain ratio (GR), chi-square (χ2), principal component 
analysis (PCA), and document frequency (DF) are examples of the widely used filter 
feature techniques [77]. The challenge in this model is to filter feature independently of the 
induction algorithm such as classification algorithm.  The relevant features are selected in 
the preprocessing step. This model does not take into consideration the effect of the 
selected features on the classification performance. The advantages of this approach over 
the wrapper, which will be discussed in the next section, is that it does not require a lot of 
computing resources and it is less time consuming.  During the preprocessing phase, 
features with the highest weight are passed to the classifier and used to build the classifier 
model. The number of the features (subset) that will be used to build the classifier model 
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is set by the user. Selecting the right number of features would affect the classifier 
performance.  
 
Figure 9: Filter feature selection model 
 
Gini Index (GI) [52, 77] also known as (Gini ratio) is a popular approach for calculating 
the discrimination level of a feature. The value of GI is in the range (1/k, 1), where k is the 
number of classes. Higher value of GI for a word indicates a greater discriminative power 
of that word. The computational time is O(𝑑 𝑤 𝑘), where d is the number of documents, w 
is number of words, and k is number of classes.  
Information Gain (IG) [15, 76, 77] is widely used for measuring the goodness of various 
features in the field of machine leaning. It is the expected reduction in entropy caused by 
partitioning the dataset instances according to a given attribute. The greater the value of 
the information gain for a specific word, the greater is the discriminatory power of the 
word. The computational time complexity is similar to GI.  
Mutual Information (MI) [15, 77] measure is very common in statistical language modeling 
of word association. It provides a formal way to model the mutual information between the 
features and the classes. The time complexity of MI is similar to IG and GI computation. 
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The weakness in this approach is that the score is strongly influenced by the marginal 
probabilities of term.  
Chi-square (χ2) [15, 77] statistic measures independence between a word X and a specific 
class C. The value of χ2 is zero if X and class C are independent. Both chi-square and MI 
are different methods of calculating the correlation between words and class. However, the 
advantage of chi-square over MI is that it is a normalized value which can be utilized to 
compare words in the same class. The time complexity of chi-square is similar to IG and 
MI computation. 
Document Frequency (DF) [15] method ranks terms based on how they are rare or frequent 
across all documents. This method is the simplest technique among the feature selection 
methods. The higher the value of DF is, the more frequent the term is and the less 
information it provides.    
Table 7 summaries the widely used methods in the literatures to calculate the feature 
weight. 
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Table 7: Features weights 
Method Formula 
Gini Index (GI) 
2
1
( ) ( )
k
ii
G w p w

   
Where w is a word  
Chi-square (χ2) 
2
2 [ ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )]( , )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
P x c P x c P x c P x c
X C
P x P x P c P c


   
Where X  is a word and C is the class 
Mutual Information (MI) 
( , )
( , ) log
( ). ( )
P X x C c
MI X x C c
P X x P C c
 
  
 
  
Where X  is a word and C is the class 
Information Gain (IG) 
,
( , )
( , ) ( , ).log
( ). ( )x c
P X x C c
IG X C P X x C c
P X x P C c
 
  
 
   
Where X  is a word and C is the class 
Document Frequency (DF) 
( ) |{ : |j jDF X d X d    
Where d is a document and X is a word 
 
2.1.5 Wrapper Feature Selection 
The second approach that is used to select features is the wrapper model [78]. This 
approach depends on the classifier since it evaluates the features based on the classifier 
performance. As illustrated in Figure 10, there are three components in this model: feature 
search, feature evaluation and classification algorithm. This approach is very slow, requires 
high computational cost for space search, and has the potential to over-fit training data.  
However, it provides higher accuracy than the filter selection method. Examples of this 
approach are the backward, forward and genetic algorithms. For instance, Figure 11 shows 
the forward feature selection algorithm [78].   
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Figure 10: The wrapper approach for feature selection 
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Figure 11: Forward feature selection algorithm 
 
2.1.6 Embedded Feature Selection 
In Embedded Feature Selection, some classification algorithms, such as random forests and 
decision trees, have built-in feature selection. In this approach the classifier automatically 
selects and identifies the best features while developing its model. The classifier as part of 
the learning phase performs variable selection to identify the optimum features.  The 
advantage of this model is that it is less computationally intensive compared to the wrapper 
approach. however,  its performance depends on the used classifier [43], [44].  
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2.2 Machine Learning Algorithms 
In the past, several research works on spam filtering have been conducted utilizing 
techniques such as Naïve Bayesian classifiers, decision trees, neural networks, etc. This 
section describes a number of selected research contributions related to email spam 
detection techniques.  
 
2.2.1 Support Vector Machine (SVM) 
SVM is considered one of the effective Machine Learning (ML) techniques used to solve 
classification problems [83]. It determines a decision boundary to divide the data space 
with the use of linear or non-linear separator between the different classes. Figure 12 shows 
how SVM separates two classes denoted by ‘x” and “o”. The separator or decision surface, 
also called hyperplane, segregates the two classes. The points that are close to the 
hyperplane are called support vectors. SVM identifies the optimal boundaries (i.e. 
maximize the margin or distance) between the different classes to be used for classification.  
SVM is one of the commonly employed techniques to solve the spam problem.  It classifies 
email by nonlinear mapping of the training dataset into a higher-dimensional feature space 
using kernel function or kernel mapping function. Then, it identifies the hyperplane that 
would maximize the distance between the two classes. One of the advantages of the SVM 
is its ability to learn independently of the feature space dimensionality.   
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Figure 12: SVM binary classification (a) small margin, (b) large margin, (c) non-linear 21 
 
2.2.2 Bayesian Learning 
This approach builds a probabilistic classifier based on modeling the underlying message 
feature in different classes [15]. It is based on Bayes rule which is described 
mathematically as follow: 
           ( ) ( | )( | )
( ) ( | ) ( ) ( | )
P A a P B b A a
P A a B b
P A a P B b A a P A a P B b A a
  
  
        
     
(2.1) 
where P(A = a) is the prior probability that a randomly picked message will be of type A, P(B = b) 
is the probability that a randomly picked message will be represented by the feature vector B = b, 
and P(B=b |A=a) is the conditional probability that a randomly picked message of type A = a will 
have the representation of B = b [15].  
  
                                                   
21 coursera.org (Machine Learning course by Stanford University) 
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2.2.3 Lazy Learning 
Lazy-learning methods are instance-based techniques. The learning phase of this approach 
is delayed until a new email needs to be classified. An example of this technique is k-NN 
(nearest neighbor) classifier. Given an email, k-NN retrieves the k most similar instances 
from pre-defined learning examples. The similarity or distance of the neighbors is defined 
by some distance measures. The drawback of this approach is that it cannot detect spam 
when the reference dataset is  huge.   
2.2.4 Rule Based 
A rule–based technique is another type of content classification. This technique is a 
knowledge-based technique that observes the presence of cretin patterns and meta-data 
within an email. Several patterns that are usually associated with spam are specific words 
and phrases, uppercase and special character distribution, and malformed headers. The left-
hand side of the  rules belong to a word pattern whereas the right-hand side is the class 
label. Scores are assigned based on the pattern and if the score is high, then the email is an 
undesired email.  This approach depends only on a set of rules and is usually augmented 
with other spam detection techniques [79]. The rule-based approach has the disadvantage 
of high false positive rate. 
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2.2.5 Others 
Various proposals were made to improve or replace the current email protocol. The existing 
Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) has a number of drawbacks, e.g. it does not check 
the identity of the message source. The researchers proposed to list the authorized outbound 
mail servers by domain owner so the email recipients can check if the email is coming from 
a legitimate source [80]. However, this approach could be bypassed and overcome by using 
spoofed IP addresses.  
Establishing a small payment for sending a message was proposed to stop spam emails. In 
this approach [6], the senders have to pay a small fee to the email recipient for each email. 
In this case, the spammers would not send tremendous number of emails because they 
would be very costly. Common and normal email users would not be impacted as the 
number of sent emails usually equals the number of received ones . 
Cryptographic authentication technique has been used to detect spam. In this approach, 
each email is augmented with digital signature of itself and its sender [72]. The email 
receiver queries the email sender for public key of the email to authenticate the email and 
its sender. Signature based filtering approach compares incoming email with the spam 
emails that have been seen before. The filter computes “signatures” for them, to identify 
the similarity. Since spam is sent in thousands if not millions, performing a similarity test 
can be used to detect spam. This approach will not block legitimate emails. However, it is 
not viable since a minor change in the email results in a different signature which makes 
this approach easy to bypass. 
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A blacklist, which can be DNS-based, email-address-based or IP-based, was also 
investigated [72]. This technique depends on collecting and storing the sources of 
spammers in a corpus to filter spam email based on this information. The legal e-mail server 
checks the corpus then denies accepting emails if the sender is blacklisted. This approach 
is very useful at the ISP level, but it has some limitations: (1) it is very difficult to keep the 
blacklist up-to-date, and (2) administrating the blacklist is costly. 
A spam model based on Random Forests (RF) was proposed using parameters optimization 
and feature selection simultaneously [45]. This work optimizes two parameters: the number 
of variables in the random subset at each node (mtry) and the number of trees in the forest 
(ntree). The objective is to maximize the classification accuracy.   
Collaborative content filtering was evaluated and researched [74]. Here, many users share 
their judgment about what is desired mail and what is considered undesired mail. Every 
time the user receives an email, a special application suggests whether it is spam or not. 
This approach was proposed because of large number of spam characteristic. The major 
characteristic is that agents can interchange knowledge about spam.  
A more advanced collaborative spam filter was experimented [73]. In this approach, a 
collaborative spam filtering system is utilized to enhance the individual spam detection 
ability. Each client runs a different algorithm. The final decision is made based on a voting 
mechanism (as an example). The used algorithms and methods are Fisher’s probability 
combination method, neural networks, naïve Bayes and decision trees. The classifications 
assigned by each approach are then linearly combined, with the weights of the classifiers 
that agree or disagree with the overall classification result. Utilizing UCI spam dataset, the 
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method achieved better results than the single method in isolation, with reduced false 
positives. The authors argued that the proposed model has important advantages, such as 
robustness to failure and easy implementation in a network. 
In [46], Symbiotic Filtering (SF) approach was proposed to enable the exchange of related 
features between different users to enhance local anti-spam filters. This work is based on a 
Content Based Filtering (CBF) and naïve Bayes learner.  The main objective of this 
approach is to share information about what each local CBF has learned. Within SF there 
are two sharing possibilities either CBF models or relevant features. Both CBF and SF use 
Evolutionary Algorithms (EAs) for feature selection and Multinomial Naïve Bayes (NB) 
variants.  
Ontology-based approach is one of the approaches to detect spam [46]. Three types of 
resource objects were used to store all kinds of information: information, data sources ID 
(user or website suppler) and information details (text or image or video). The developed 
module executes ontology reasoning and semantic similarity computation for the samples 
in the spam ontology samples database and newly acquired information. It determines the 
spam probability according to the calculation results. To block messages, the module filters 
them using three kinds of information: “sending number’s information” e.g. user brand and 
balance, “sending information of sending number” e.g. sending time segment, and 
credibility of sending number such as spam credibility of sending number . 
 
Table 8 gives an over view of the widely used classifiers in the literature and which part of 
the email it analysis to classify the message. The table also shows the advantages and 
disadvantages of each method. 
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Table 8: Comparison of classifiers 
Method 
Email 
segment/part 
Advantages Disadvantages Used in 
Rule‐Based 
Learning 
(RIPPER) 
Body  Fast training and classification 
 Easily  bypassed 
 High false positive rates 
[48], [49] 
k-Nearest 
Neighbor 
Body 
Header 
 No explicit training 
 Sensitive to the value of k 
 Can encounter problems in very high 
dimensional spaces 
[50] 
Bayesian  
Body 
Header 
 Quick training and classification  Bayesian poisoning [50] 
Neural 
Networks 
Body 
Header 
 Fast to run 
 Handles noisy data well 
 Long training time [49] 
Support Vector 
Machines 
Body 
Header 
 Execution speed is very fast 
 Easy to integrate with end user interactive 
feedback approach. 
 Easy to implements 
 Training time increases exponentially 
with the number of training elements 
involved  
 Prone to overfitting and thus bad 
generalization 
 Perform very badly if the features are 
highly correlated.  
[2], [20], [46] 
Boosting 
(AdaBoost) 
Body 
Header 
 Seems not to over-ﬁt in practice 
 Very simple to implement 
 Unable to handle weak learners with an 
error rate greater than 1/2. 
 Long training time 
[51] 
SMTP-path 
Analysis 
Header  Fast  classification 
 Easy to bypass by using a new IP source 
(spoof IP address) 
[53] 
Social 
Networks 
Header  Fast  classification  Misclassification of new sender [54] 
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2.3 Biological Background 
A number of computational algorithms have been inspired by the biological immune 
system. These innovative algorithms are becoming integral part of the growing field in 
computer science known as artificial immune system (AIS) [55]. The artificial immune 
system is considered as a branch of computational intelligence as shown in Figure 13. The 
evolution of AIS area is illustrated in Figure 14. 
 
 
Figure 13: Artificial immune system as a branch of computational intelligence 
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Figure 14: The evolution of AIS [56]. 
  
The major players of the human immune system are shown in Figure 15. This system 
consists of three protection layers as shown in Figure 16. The first layer is the physical 
barriers (e.g. skin in the human body). The other two layers are the innate and adaptive 
immune systems. Figure 17 depicts the type of cells that belongs to innate immune system 
and adaptive system.  
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Figure 15: Human immune system locations22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16: Human immune system layers 
                                                   
22 https://www.aids.gov/hiv-aids-basics/just-diagnosed-with-hiv-aids/hiv-in-your-body/immune-system-
101/ 
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Figure 17: Innate and adaptive immune system cells23 
 
2.3.1 Innate Immune System 
Innate Immune system reacts quickly to invaders (virus, bacteria, parasite, or to another 
person's tissues). It eliminates attacker in a period of time that can be minutes or hours.  
This is because the system does not differentiate between attackers. It only identifies non-
self or self. There is no learning process in this system. The reaction does not change over 
the lifetime of the human. This system is very powerful. However, some microbes have 
learned to pass thought it. Therefore, there is a system called adaptive immune system 
which handles such type of attack. 
                                                   
23 http://www.nature.com/nrc/journal/v4/n1/fig_tab/nrc1252_F1.html 
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2.3.2 Adaptive Immune System 
The adaptive immune system is activated by the innate immune system to present response 
to specific pathogens. The adaptive immune system can learn and adapt its behavior to 
various types of pathogens [57]. This system is more complex and more advanced than the 
previous system. It evolves and adapts itself to handle new attackers.  
The other capability that this system has is memory. This feature enables it to identify 
invader and recognize whether such invader has been identified previously. Hence, a 
formerly developed defense is reloaded and utilized to eliminate this invader quickly as 
shown in Figure 18. B-cells and T-cells are highly specialized defender cells of this system.  
 
 
Figure 18: Adaptive immune system response time24 
 
                                                   
24 https://www.boundless.com/biology/textbooks/boundless-biology-textbook/the-immune-system-
42/adaptive-immune-response-234/immunological-memory-878-12128/ 
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2.4 AIS Algorithms and Applications 
Artificial Immune System (AIS) was developed to mimic the human immune system. AIS 
categorization is based on the features of the immune systems that stimulate them. There 
are four main AIS approaches: Negative Selection Algorithm (NSA), Clonal Selection 
Algorithm (CSA), Algorithms based on idiotypic network model, and Dendritic Cell 
Algorithm (DCA). 
AIS algorithms are performing similar function to the natural immune systems, i.e. 
defending and maintaining the system or host that they are running into. There are two 
generations of the artificial immune systems [58]. The first generation includes the 
following algorithms: 
• Negative selection: designed for change detection, two-class classification, and 
intrusion detection problems.  
• Clonal selection: mainly applied to function optimization and pattern recognition 
problems. 
• Immune network: leveraged in unsupervised clustering problem domains. 
This generation mimics the simplest models of the human immune system. Therefore, it 
has considerable limitations when applied to realistic problems. For example, the negative 
selection algorithm might have issue with scalability. It also generates high number of false 
alarms when applied to the intrusion detection problem.  
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The second generation is the Dendritic Cell Algorithm (DCA) which was developed as part 
of the “Danger Project” [58]. The objective of this project was to bring together latest 
research related to immunology and AIS to enhance the results of intrusion detection 
solution.  
2.4.1 Negative Selection Algorithm (NSA) 
The Negative Selection Algorithm (NSA) is inspired by the T-cell behavior which belongs 
to the adaptive immune system. The adaptive immune system has ability to tell the 
difference between structures of its own (self) and foreign ones (non-self). Figure 19 shows 
the self and non-self pattern. A theory for “Self” and “non-self” was proposed based on 
this observation. T-cells are exposed to agents that are part of human. Agent that is part of 
human will not be attacked by trained T-cells. The immune system ensures that infectious 
agents are attacked by properly identified T-cells.  
This algorithm can classify agents as self or non-self by trying to match T-cells with each 
pattern that is being classified. If none of the T-cells categorizes the pattern as non-self, 
then that agent is identified as self. This algorithm needs a training phase. During the 
training phase, several patterns are exposed to the classifier. If a T-cell mistakenly 
identifies a pattern as non-self, it will be rejected.   After completing the training, the self-
pattern (originated from the body) identifies self and non-self (coming from outside). The 
algorithm works as follows: 
• The system initializes a certain number of random detectors called “naïve detectors”. 
• A self-set is produced by the system from the training data to contain data instances 
that are normal. 
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• The initialized naïve detectors in the first step are compared with the self-set to 
generate detectors that react to attacker. 
• An alert will be triggered if the detector reacts to incoming instance. 
 
 
 
Figure 19: Non-self vs. self-pattern25 
 
2.4.2 Clonal Selection Algorithm (CSA) 
The CSA was derived from Brunett’s theory of immune memory and clonal selection. It 
includes immune cells called B-cells [81]. This type of cells generates antibodies capable 
of recognizing diverse and numerous patterns of attacks or threats. Memory cells which 
are part of the immune memory can remember previously seen threats. This algorithm is 
applied to optimization and pattern recognition domains. The CSA algorithm works as 
follows [81]: 
                                                   
25 http://cse-wiki.unl.edu/wiki/index.php/Artificial_Immune_Systems 
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• A number of random solutions to a given problem is initialized by the system. 
• The initialized solutions are exposed to training. 
• Based on a similarity measure, the best solutions are selected to generate several 
clones. 
• A high frequency transformation process is conducted on the current solution. 
• Memory cells are formed the best solutions.  
• The previous steps are repeated until termination point is reached. 
2.4.3 Idiotypic Network Based Algorithms 
The third approach is using idiotypic network based algorithms. These algorithms were 
developed based on the theory of immune network by Jerne [81]. There are some 
similarities between this approach and CSA. It also shares properties with artificial neural 
networks. The immune system in this approach is seen as a network where immune 
elements communicate and work together even with the absence of antigens. The 
antibodies represent the nodes and the training algorithm involves growing or pruning 
edges between the nodes based on affinity. Immune network algorithms have been used in 
clustering, data visualization, control, and optimization domains.  
2.4.4 AIS Applications 
There are several applications for AIS algorithms due to their promising results [58, 59, 
60, 62, 81]. A common application is to use the AIS algorithms to solve the Intrusion 
Detection problems to monitor network and detect network attacks by examining several 
symptoms. The number of login attempts, network traffic, and downloaded files sizes could 
be used as inputs to the solution. The system is considered under attack if the level of 
45 
 
danger is above a predefined threshold. Another application of AIS is detecting viruses in 
computers utilizing negative selection algorithm. The infected files can be recognized by 
T-cells. By leveraging this technique, the system can improve itself and detect mutated 
viruses.  
2.5 Biological & Artificial Dendritic Cells  
Due to the evolution in our understanding of the human immune system, a second 
generation of the artificial immune system was introduced. The new generation was 
developed in collaboration with immunologists. It includes several properties of the 
immune system such as robustness, error tolerance, and self-organization. The Dendritic 
Cell Algorithm (DCA) is the main algorithm that was developed recently as a second 
generation [59]. It was developed based on the danger theory, specifically the function and 
role of dendritic cells. Several researches were conducted and proved that DCA has the 
potential to solve security problems. For example, it was used in intrusion detection such 
as ping scan, botnet, and SYN scan with high accuracy. Before explaining the DCA 
algorithm, we start by giving a brief background about classical and danger theories that 
explain the human immune system.  
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2.5.1 Classical Immune System Theory 
The classical theory that explained the immunology was based on self and non-self 
paradigm [60]. This theory stating that the immune system has the ability to distinguish 
between the body’s own cells, recognized as “self,” and foreign cells, or “non-self.” The 
body’s immune defenses normally coexist peacefully with cells that carry distinctive “self” 
marker molecules. But when immune defenders encounter foreign cells or organisms 
carrying markers that say “non-self”, they quickly launch an attack as shown in Figure 20. 
This theory failed in explaining the immune system reaction to several cases; for example: 
• The immune system does not react to foreign bacteria such as the bacteria that are 
coming from food for example, are considered as non-self (foreign). 
• Useful auto-reactive action against self-molecules are generated by stressed cells. 
• Over the lifetime the human body changes and thus self changes as well. Hence, the 
question arises whether defenses against non-self learned early in life might be auto 
reactive later. 
• The immune system does not attack successful transplant (which is non-self). 
 
 
Figure 20: Antigens carry marker molecules that identify them as foreign26 
                                                   
26 http://thyroid.about.com/library/immune/blimm02.htm 
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2.5.2 Danger Theory 
Due to the limitation of the old human immune system theory, researchers came up with 
another theory called danger theory [60]. This theory became popular over the past decade 
as it debates the old theory and points out that there is something beyond self and non-self 
distinction. It came up with the following conclusion about the immune system: it 
discriminates “some self from some non-self”.  This theory describes the immune system 
as a system that does not attack non-self when it is harmless. However, it attacks self when 
it is harmful. This idea depends really on the idea of discrimination (which is the old 
viewpoint) except it reacts to danger not foreignness. In this  theory,  danger  is  measured 
by  damage  to  cells indicated  by  distress signals  that  are  sent  out  when  cells die in 
unnatural  death. Figure 21 depicts the danger theory model.   
 
 
Figure 21: Danger theory model 27 
                                                   
27 https://jackeylu.wordpress.com/2011/02/27/danger-theory-the-missing-link-between-artificial-immune-
systems-and-intrusion/ 
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This theory was proposed by Matzinger and suggests that [60]: 
• The immune system responds to signals of danger, rather than discriminating self 
from non-self. 
• DCs gather debris in the tissue which are mixed with signals from the environment. 
• Some of the suspicious debris produced by the attacker are called antigens. 
• The danger signals are emitted by injured ordinary cells. 
• DCs are responsible for the initial detection of invaders beside the induction of a 
variety of immune responses against such invaders. 
- The DC is able to analyze and integrate these signals to decide whether the 
environment is safe or dangerous. 
- If the signal is safe, the DC becomes semi-mature (as shown in Figure 22).  
-  If the signal is dangerous, the DC becomes mature and instructs the adaptive 
system to respond. 
• Antigen-presenting cells (APC) are activated via an alarm (danger signals). 
• For T-cells to initiate an effective adaptive immune response, they require a co- 
stimulatory signal from APC. 
There are three states of maturation of DCs as shown in Figure 23:  
• Immature: collect parts of the signals and antigen (initial). 
• Semi-mature: is an immature cell that internally decides that the local signals indicate 
safe. 
• Mature: cell internally agree that the local signals indicate danger. 
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Figure 22: Transformation between DC states [60] 
 
 
 
 
Figure 23: DC states [60] 
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Signals in DC are normally pre-categorized as: 
• PAMP: an indicator to measure the existence of anomalous behavior, e.g. an event 
that harms the system. PAMP values increase as the observation of anomalous 
behavior increases.  
• Danger: an indicator to measure the existence of a potential anomalous behavior. As 
the existence of a potential anomaly increases, the value of danger increases 
accordingly. 
• Safe: an indicator to measure the confidence of a normal system behavior. 
The DCs process two types of molecular information which are signals and antigens. From 
the local environment, the DCs gather the signals and indicators of the health of the 
monitored tissue (e.g. currently in distress or under attack). Knowing this information only 
could not help in identifying the source of the anomaly. Therefore, an antigen is required 
in order to link the evidence of the changing behavior of the tissue with the cause of this 
change in the behavior.  In other words, the antigen is a potential originator of an anomaly 
and the classification of the antigen is based on the correlation between signals and antigens 
across the DC population. 
2.5.3 Dendritic Cell Algorithm (DCA) 
The development of the DCA algorithm follows the model shown in Figure 24. It was 
initiated as part of the danger Project [60]. The objective of the project was to bring together 
latest research from immunology and AIS to enhance the results of an intrusion detection 
system. The initial work presented by Greensmith was a DCA capable of finding danger 
signals within the standard Breast Cancer UCI Machine Learning data set [60].  
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Figure 24: A depiction of the process used to develop the DCA  
 
This algorithm correlates disparate data-streams in the form of antigens and signals then 
labels groups of identical antigens as “anomalous” or “normal”.  There are two categories 
of input data: 
• Signals: represented as a vector of numbers as measures of the monitored system’s 
status at a point of time. 
• Antigens: represent the instances that need to be classified.  
Several dendritic cells are deployed and work in parallel as detectors.  Within the DC 
population, diversity is generated through the system lifespans. This would limit the 
quantity of information a DC object would process. During the DCs initialization phase, 
they are assigned different values for their lifespans. The DCA capability of detection is 
governed by the correlation of signals and antigens and the DC population diversity. 
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The dendritic cells receive three categories of signals (PAMP, danger and safe) and process 
them. Within the DCA algorithm, weights are manually predefined for each signal type. 
This controls the transformation of a cell based on input signals to output signals as shown 
in Figure 25. The status of the monitored systems is evaluated by the output signal. This is 
used to determine the presence of anomalies or misbehaviors. 
 
 
Figure 25: Signals weights and transformation to output 
 
The final decision to classify an antigen is made based on the number of DCs that are fully 
mature. This could be done by voting or more advance approaches such as calculating a 
‘mature context antigen value’ (MCAV) using the following equation: 
                                                    MMCAV
Ag
                           (2.5) 
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Where M is the number of mature cells within the antigen and Ag is the sum of the 
exposures to the antigen by those mature cells. MCAV gives a probability of a pattern being 
an anomaly. The closer this values to 1, the greater the probability that the antigen is 
anomalous.  
The algorithm processing is on three stages as shown in Figure 26: initialization, update, 
and aggregation. The initialization includes setting several parameters. In the next phase, 
the values of signals and antigens are updated each time new data appears in the system. 
Finally, the aggregation phase is initiated, where all collected antigens are subsequently 
analyzed and the MCAV per antigen is derived. Figure 27 shows the algorithm pseudo 
code and Figure 28 illustrates the basics of its operation [60, 61]. 
 
 
Figure 26: DCA three stages [61] 
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Figure 27: DCA pseudo code 
 
 
 
 
Figure 28: Decision of one cell 
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2.5.4 DCA Related Work 
DCA has been implemented in several domains including plant classification, fraud 
detection, robotics security, botnet detection, port scanning detection, and more. The 
results show that the DCA is a promising solution. This section highlights examples of 
recent works that leverage the DCA. 
In [62], DCA is used to classify plant leaves. The wavelet transform was used as a space 
feature and DCA as a classifier. Antigens were represented by leaves images. Moreover, 
two types of signals were used: safe and danger. The safe signal was the distance between 
an unknown leaf texture features and known texture features called j. For the danger signal, 
it was represented by the distance between unknown leaf texture and j` unknown texture 
feature. The recognition result’s accuracy was about 94%.  
DCA was used to detect the break-in fraud for an online video on demand system [63]. 
Three groups of signals were used: PAMP, danger and safe. PAMP signals were 
represented by failures to order movies and danger signals were represent by successful 
movie order [63]. For the safe signals, three signals were used. The first two are associated 
with the login process and the third one is related to the billing notification. The results 
demonstrated that using the DCA to detect fraud has highly accurate decisions. 
One of the successful applications of the DCA is botnet detection [75]. The DCA was used 
to detect the existence of a single bot on a compromised machine. Three types of signals 
were used to detect a bot. The PAMP signal was identified by the rate of change on 
invocation of selected API related to key logging activity whereas the danger signal was 
derived from the time difference between sending and receiving data. The time difference 
between outgoing consecutive communication function such as (send, send) was used for 
the safe signal. The experiments showed low rates of false positive and high rates of true 
positive.  
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3 CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
In this chapter, we provide an overview of the proposed model of how email classification 
problem can be solved based on ideas from the Dendritic Cell Algorithm (DCA).  We start 
with an overview of the system architecture. After that, we discuss the feature extraction 
of message content. Finally, we discuss the DCA classification technique. 
3.1 Proposed Model Overview 
In our proposed filtering model, we have considered two main parts of the email message: 
header fields and content. For SMS we considered the message content, but we enrich the 
content by adding tags. The system preprocesses the message content by removing HTML 
tags, stop words, and white spaces. After that, the system extracts different feature sets 
from the message content. Some features are extracted and selected based on opinions from 
a security expert, i.e. spam clues that an expert would normally look for. The system then 
uses a signal generator component to generate the required signals for the DCA algorithm. 
At the DCA fusion stage, the system classifies the input message based on its MCAV value. 
Figure 29 shows the system architecture of the proposed DCA classification system. The 
system consists five components: feature extraction, feature selection, signal generator, 
fusion and DCA algorithm. In the feature extraction there are two sub component one for 
extracting feature to filter and email and the other component is to extract feature for email 
classification. Figure 30 shows feature extraction process for spam filtering and Figure 31 
illustrates feature extraction for email classification.  The next step is to select most relative 
57 
 
features. Then, generate required signals and fuse them to right category. The last 
component is the DCA algorithm to classify an email to filter spam email. 
In the next chapter, we will investigate the performance of our model on several datasets.  
The next sections explain the system phases based on the proposed system architecture.    
 
 
Figure 29: Layout of the proposed system 
 
 
Figure 30: Feature extraction for spam filtering 
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Figure 31: Feature extraction for email classification 
 
3.2 Feature Extraction 
There are two components within the feature extraction process. The first component is for 
spam filtering and the second one is for email classification. This process must be fast and 
should not require complex analysis; otherwise, it will delay the classification process. The 
features must be easily extracted from the message and empirically enhance the 
classification process.  
We extract few features; however, their impact on the classifier’s performance is 
significant. Novel features with low computing resources are extracted. These features 
mimic security expert practices to distinguish spam from legitimate. The extracted features 
are presented as a vector using Vector Space Model (VSM).  The vector could be 
represented as:   
                                                    1 2 , ,...( ), mY y y y                         (3.1) 
where m is the number of features (attributes). Each attribute will be given a weight to 
measure its importance to the message.  
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This step is considered the first step in the proposed model.  Other processes depend on 
this step.  
3.2.1 Spam Email Feature Extraction: 
For the spam filtering process, some features will use lowercased tokens such as spam 
words and function word. The following features will be considered: 
 Names of persons, organizations, money, and locations are recognized and tagged 
in the model as shown in the example in Figure 32. These tags are called 
“All_Tags”. We use OpenNLP to perform this process. 
 Emotion symbols: We consider this feature since non-spammers use it very often 
in SMS message. Examples of these symbols are happy, angry or sad faces.  
 Special characters: Spammers use special characters most of the time to encourage 
end-users to click on a link. For example, the dollar sign “$” is used for winning a 
prize. 
 Gappy words: They are words that have gaps between its characters such as “@” 
and “.”. 
 Special words with different variations (e.g. misspelled) are also extracted. 
Examples of these words are prescription, price, and Viagra. 
  JavaScript Code: Existence of Java Script code within the email body is a sign of 
phishing or spam. Hence, JavaScript code in the message is also extracted. 
 IP address: We consider IP address as a feature since spam most of the time asks 
the user to click on a link to visit a website for a prize or to download an application. 
Moreover, the link directs the user to an IP address not to a domain name.  
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 Likely spam words: This is a set of terms that are most commonly used by 
spammers and are related to finance, dating, prizes, etc. [64]. We used the existence 
of terms listed in [64], [65]. We evaluated three lists of spam words:  
o The first list contains 17,000 spam words that we have collected from different 
sources. It is independent of the datasets on which our model is tested. It will 
be called Ind_17K_Spam_Words. This list consists of English and non-English 
keywords commonly used by spammers.  
o The second list contains 350 spam words that we have collected from different 
sources.  It is also independent of the dataset on which our model is tested. It 
will be called Ind_350_Spam_Words. This list consists of English words that 
are widely used by email spammers.  
o The third list contains 250 spam words extracted from the dataset that we tested 
our model on. This list will be changed based on the dataset that we will test 
our model on. This list will be called Dep_250_SpamWords. 
 Message metadata: This feature includes document length, which is the overall byte 
length of number of tokens and average token length. 
 Function words (or grammatical words): These are words which have little lexical 
meaning or have ambiguous meaning, but exist to explain structural or grammatical 
relationships with other words within a sentence or specify the mood or attitude of 
the author.  This feature is a closed class of words. There are relatively small and 
fixed number of function words, e.g. English language has around 300 function 
words. Function words are lexically unproductive and are generally invariable in 
form.  Prepositions, pronouns, determiners, conjunctions, auxiliary verbs, and 
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particles are all considered function words.  We evaluated function words feature 
because they are very unlikely to be subject to conscious control by author. This is 
due to their high frequency of use and highly grammatical role [66].  We leverage 
the word list available in [67]. Examples of function words are listed in Table 9. 
 Blank-To: Spammers usually address the email to a group of users and put the 
names into the “BCC” (i.e., Blind Carbon Copy) field in the email. 
 Number of characters in the “To” field. We used this feature as the spammer send 
the email to a randomly generated list of users. 
 Number of users in the “To” field. We used this feature as spammer sometimes 
addresses the email to too several users. 
 Number of users in the CC field. We used this feature as spammer sometimes 
addresses the email to too several users. 
 Number of spam words in the subject fields. Spammer includes spam words in the 
subject fields to motivate the user to open the email quickly and click on the link.  
 Spam domain: Several Internet domains have issues with their mail servers such as 
allowing sending email without authentication. We created a list of 200+ distrusted 
domains that are known of sending spam email. 
 Subject capital: Using uppercase characters in the email subject would grab the end-
user attention quickly; therefore, spammers use it. 
 Subject length. This feature was explored because the spammer might use one word 
for the subject to grab the end user attention.  
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Table 9: Examples of function words 
Class Size Examples 
Prepositions 124 of, at, in, without, between 
Pronouns 70 
he, him, she, her, they, anybody, it, 
one 
Determiners 28 
the, a, that, my, more, much, either, 
neither, all, each 
Conjunctions 44 and, that, when, while, although, or 
Auxiliary and modal verbs 17 
verbs be (is, am, are), have, got, do, 
shall 
Particles >86 
no, not, nor, as, if, then, well, 
however, thus 
 
 
Figure 32: Example of tagging for organizations 
 
3.2.2 Email Multi-Category Classification Feature Extraction: 
For the email classification, the email content is parsed, analyzed, and normalized to be 
presented into clear word format.  At this phase, the message is prepared for the next stage 
by performing the following processes: 
 Tokenization: Each email message is treated as a string and then divided into a 
sequence of tokens.  
 Lowercasing of content: The entire message content is converted into lower case, 
so that capitalization is ignored.  
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 Removal of HTML tags: Many emails often come with HTML formatting. We 
remove all HTML tags so that only the text content remains. 
 Removal of stop words: These are words that usually do not affect the context. They 
are removed from the message. Table 10 shows some examples of stop words that 
are removed by the model. For a complete list of stop words, refer to Appendix I. 
 Word stemming: Words are reduced to their stemmed bases or root forms, e.g. 
removing all suffixes and prefixes such as “tion”, “ing”, and “er”. This process 
reduces the size of the feature set. There are several stemming approaches and 
algorithms such as table lookup approach, successor variety, n-gram stemmers, 
Porter stemming algorithm, and Paice/Husk stemming algorithm. In our work, 
Porter stemming algorithm is used since it is widely used [68].   
 Removal of non-words: All white spaces (tabs, newlines, and spaces) are trimmed 
to a single space character.  
Table 10: Sample of stop words 
a's able about above according 
accordingly across actually after afterwards 
again against ain't all allow 
allows almost alone along already 
also although always am among 
 
 
 
Table 11: Examples of rooted words using Porter Algorithm 28 
                                                   
28 http://tartarus.org/~martin/PorterStemmer/index.html 
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3.3 Feature Selection  
 We used Gini Index (GI) approach for feature selection. It is also known as (Gini ratio). It 
is one of the widely utilized methods to calculate the discrimination level of a feature [69]. 
GI calculates the weight of each feature with respect to classification by computing the 
Gini index of the class distribution.  The value of the GI is between (1/k, 1), where k is the 
number of classes. The higher value of GI for a feature indicates a greater discriminative 
power of that feature.  The computational time is O(d .w .k), where d is the number of 
documents, w is number of words, and k is number of classes. The Gini index is calculated 
using the following equation: 
 2
1
(w) ( )
k
i
i
G p w

   (3.2) 
where pi(w) is the conditional probability that a message belongs to class i given the fact 
that it contains the word w. 
 
3.4 Signals Generator 
This phase is an essential component in our model since the DCA depends on it to classify 
the input message. We developed two versions of this component. The first version uses 
Word Root 
minding mind 
frames frame 
demise demis 
resolves resolv 
waverer waver 
lodge lodg 
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three machine-learning algorisms to generate the required signals. The second version uses 
two machine-learning algorithms and provides more accurate results with fewer resources 
and less computing time. This version is more efficient and scalable compared to the first 
version. In the upcoming sections, we will refer to the first version as 3c-DCA and to the 
second version as 2c-DCA. 
1) 3c-DCA Signals Generator  
In the initial proposed model, the three types of signals needed in DCA are generated using 
three machine-learning algorithms. The PAMP signal, which usually indicates an 
anomalous situation, is generated using the confidence level of a k-NN (k nearest neighbor) 
algorithm. The second type of signals is the existence of danger signal which may or may 
not present an anomalous situation. However, the probability of an anomaly is higher than 
under normal circumstances. In our experimental work, we employed the Naïve Bayes 
algorithm to generate the danger signal. Finally, the existence of safe signals indicate no 
anomalies exist. In our model, we utilized a Support Vector Machine (SVM) to produce 
the safe signal. The three signals are normalized between 0 and 1 before passing them to 
the DCA phase. 
2) 2c-DCA Signals Generator  
For this model, we used two machine-learning algorithms: Naïve Bayes (NB) and Support 
Vector Machine (SVM) algorithm. The PAMP signal indicates a high level of assurance of 
anomalous situation. It is generated using confidence level of one of the two classifiers if 
both agree with each other that the antigen is spam. The second type of signals is the 
existence of danger signals, which may or may not present an anomalous situation. 
However, the probability of an anomaly is higher than under normal circumstances. In our 
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experimental work, we used the average confidence level of the two classifiers if they 
disagree on the antigen classification. Finally, the existence of a safe signal indicates that 
no anomalies are exist. In our model, if the two classifiers agrees that the antigen is non-
spam we utilize the confidence level of one of the two classifiers to be the safe signal. The 
pseudo code of this process is outlined in Figure 33.The two signals are normalized 
between 0 and 1 before passing them to the DCA phase. 
 
 
Figure 33: Process for calculating PAMP, safe and danger signals 
 
3.5 Fusion Using DCA 
Email messages (antigens) and signals for each email message are passed to the DCA as 
input. Moreover, each antigen is sampled multiple times using antigen multiplier to 
overcome the problem of antigen deficiency and to ensure it appears in different contexts 
[63]. The derived signals and associated antigens are presented to the DCA algorithm. The 
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DCA transforms the input signals into two output signals: CSM and K signals. If the CSM 
value is greater than a migration threshold of dendritic cells (which is randomly assigned), 
the dendritic cell stops sampling antigens and signals. K is the overall amount of 
abnormality of signals seen by a dendritic cell. These two output signals are calculated as 
follows:  
  
                
, , ,n csm w n csm w n csm wCSM P P D D S S                                                         (3.3) 
              
, , ,n k w n k w n k wK P P D D S S                                                                       (3.4) 
where Pn is the PAMP input signal value, Dn is the danger signal value, Sn is the safe value; 
Pcsm,w, Dcsm,w and Scsm,w are the weights related to the calculation of CSM; PK,w, Dk,w, and 
Sk,w are the weights related to the calculation of K. The mature context antigen value 
(MCAV) for each antigen type is calculated and compared with a threshold for final 
prediction. The MCAV value is calculated for each antigen type using the following 
formula: 
                                       i
M
MCAV
Ag


                                                              (3.5) 
where i refers to the antigen type (spam), Mi refers to the number of times that antigen 
appears in the mature context, and ∑ 𝐴𝑔 is the total number of antigens. The MCAV value 
is used to classify an email by comparing it with a preset threshold calculated from: 
                                                            
an
at
tn
                                                     (3.6) 
68 
 
where at is the derived threshold, an is the number of anomalous data items and tn is the 
total number of data items. The classification rule is as follows: 
                      
   spam i at
ham other
f
w
MCS
is
V
e
i


                                   (3.7) 
Figure 34 illustrates the DCA algorithm pseudo code. 
 
Figure 34: Pseudo code for DCA 
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4 CHAPTER 4 
EXPERIMENTS 
This chapter presents the results and discussions of our research findings. We first describe 
the adopted datasets in our work and the measures to evaluate the proposed model.  The 
experiments and discussions have been divided into three parts. The first part discusses the 
experiment of using the first version of DCA (called 3c-DCA). The second part discusses 
the second version of DCA (called 2c-DCA). Finally, the third part discusses the general 
email classification problem using 2c-DCA.   
4.1 Experiments Setup 
We performed several experiments to compare our proposed model with well-known 
machine-learning algorithms such as Naïve Bayes (NB), SVM, and k-NN. The experiments 
were conducted on several datasets that are listed in the next section. RapidMiner version 
6.5 was utilized to measure the performance of the machine-leaning algorithms. Default 
configurations of the algorithms were used in our experiments as shown in Table 12. We 
used a machine with 8 GB RAM, 2.4 GHz CPU, and Microsoft Windows 8.1. 
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Table 12 Machine Learning Configuration 
Algorithms Parameters 
K-NN k = 1 
Support Vector Machine Max Iteration = 100000 
 
4.2 Datasets 
To evaluate our work we used five datasets for spam filtering and one dataset for email 
classification. Table 13 provides a summary of the used datasets and their usage in our 
work. These datasets are explained in Section 2.1.1( Table 2, Table 3 and Table 4). 
 
Table 13: Used Datasets 
Dataset 
Dataset size (number of 
messages) Used in 
Dataset 
Type 
Total Spam Non-spam 
Spambase 4601 1813 2788 
Spam Filtering 
Email SpamAssassin 9324 2387 6937 
TREC2005 92,189 52,790 39,399 
UCI SMS Spam 5,574 747 4827 
SMS 
SMS Big 1,423 322 1,002 
Enron 30,041 13,496 16,545 Email Classification Email 
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4.3 Evaluation Measures 
Several performance measures were used which could be calculated online, using real 
measurements, or offline, using pre-collected and classified email messages. Offline 
provides quick insights about the filter effectiveness.  
The classifier results were compared with other model results using True Positive (TP), 
True Negative (TN), False Positive (FP) and False Negative (FN) measures. In this context, 
a positive means spam. For example, a “true positive” is a spam message which is correctly 
classified as a spam and a “false positive” is a non-spam message which is wrongly 
classified as a spam. Confusion matrix or contingency table is used to visualize the classifier 
performance as shown in Table 14. This matrix focus on the capability of the classifier to 
predict an input without taking into consideration the model performance. The matrix  
 
Table 14: Confusion matrix 
 
Predicted 
A
ct
u
al
 
 Spam 
(Positive) 
Legitimate 
(Negative) 
Spam 
 (Positive) 
TP FN 
Legitimate 
(Negative) 
FP TN 
 
 
 
72 
 
Moreover, over all filtering accuracy metric (Acc), Precision, Recall, and AUC were used 
to measure the performance of the classifier. Below is a definition of these measures [70]:  
 Accuracy: measures the effectiveness of the classification model based on the fraction 
of correctly classified email messages and is given by: 
                                                   
TP TN
Acc
TP FP FN TN


  
     (4.1) 
 False Negative Rate (FNR): measures the proportion of spam email messages that are 
falsely classified as legitimate and is calculated using the following formula: 
                                                   
 
FN FN
FNR
Total Positive TP FN
 

   (4.2) 
 False Positive Rate (FPR): measures the proportion of legitimate e-mails that are falsely 
classified as spam and is calculated using the following formula: 
                                          
 
FP FP
FPR
Total Negative TN FP
 

    (4.3)   
 Spam Precision (SP): measures the level to which rejected messages by the spam filter 
are truly spam, i.e. the proportion of email messages classified as spam that are truly 
spam: 
                                                                      
 
TP
SP
TP FP

     (4.4) 
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 Ham (non-spam) Precision (HP): calculates the level to which emails not rejected by the 
spam filter and they are truly ham, i.e. the proportion of e-mails classified as ham that 
are truly ham: 
                                                                       
TN
HP
TN FN


   (4.5) 
 Spam Recall (SR): calculates the fraction of spam messages discarded by the spam filter, 
i.e. the proportion of spam e-mails that are classified as spam: 
                                             
 
TP TP
SR
Total Positive TP FN
 

    (4.6) 
 Ham (non-spam) Recall (HR): calculates the fraction of ham emails accepted by the 
filter, i.e. the proportion of ham e-mails that are classified as ham: 
                                              
TN TN
HR
Total Negative TN FP
 
    (4.7) 
 Spam F-Measure (FM): combined measure of the precision and recall metrics for spam 
class and it is calculated using the following formula: 
                                              
2
 
SP SR
FM spam
SP SR
 


                                               (4.8) 
 Ham F-Measure (FM): combined measure of the precision and recall metrics for ham 
class and it is calculated using the following formula: 
                                              
2
 
HP HR
FM ham
HP HR
 


                                         (4.9) 
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 Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC): is a curve showing the tradeoff between TPR 
and FPR. ROC is showing in a graphical diagram.  
 Area under curve (AUC): measures the area under the ROC curve. 
 
4.4 Spambase and SpamAssassin Experiment (using 3C-DCA) 
 
We first applied the proposed DCA solutions using 3c-DCA on the Spambase dataset. The 
goal is to demonstrate the capability of DCA to filter the spam emails. There are three 
parameters in DCA: signals weights, number of DCA cells, and antigen multiplier. We 
selected the best values for the DCA parameters based on their impact on the performance 
in terms of AUC. We attempted different values for the number of cells and antigen 
multiplier in the range from 1 to 100. However, we only reported here the results of a 
sample of the tested values to manage the space.   
First, we set the signal weights at their default values and changed the multiplier parameter 
as well as the number of DCs. The default parameter values used for DCA are shown in 
Table 15. Table 16 presents a sample of the results, where the best AUC occurs when the 
antigen multiplier is 100 and number of DCs is 30. Then, we fixed the above two 
parameters at their best values and changed the signal weights. The results of this series 
are shown in Table 17, where the best AUC is achieved at the highlighted values for the 
signal weights.  
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Table 15 DCA default parameters value 
Parameters Value 
Number of cells 100 
Antigen multiplier 50 
Signals weights 
  2   1   1
  2   3   1
CSM PAMP Safe Danger
K PAMP Safe Danger
     
     
 
 
 
Table 16: DCA AUC performance by changing Antigen multiplier and DCs 
 
Antigen Multiplier 
10 30 50 70 100 
N
o
. 
o
f 
D
C
s 
10 0.500 0.537 0.599 0.650 0.699 
30 0.514 0.649 0.727 0.759 0.761 
50 0.521 0.644 0.718 0.759 0.683 
70 0.524 0.619 0.699 0.723 0.761 
100 0.527 0.594 0.683 0.716 0.740 
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Table 17: DCA performance for several signals weights 
PAMPcsm,w PAMPk,w Safecsm,w Safek,w Dangercsm,w Dangerk,w AUC 
2 2 1 0 1 1 0.761 
2 2 1 -3 1 1 0.999 
2 1 1 -3 1 1 0.998 
2 1 1 -3 10 1 0.986 
15 1 0 -2 10 1 0.983 
2 6 2 -1 1 1 0.968 
2 2 1 -1 1 1 0.986 
2 10 0 -1 1 1 0.95 
2 6 2 0 1 1 0.761 
2 6 2 -2 1 1 0.988 
2 1 50 -3 40 1 0.979 
3 10 0 -1 1 30 0.623 
20 1 0 -2 10 1 0.983 
1 10 0 -1 1 1 0.921 
2 20 1 -3 1 1 0.973 
3 10 0 -1 1 50 0.585 
 
The results of the series of experiments show that DCA is very sensitive to several 
parameters. We achieved 0.999 AUC for spam classification in this case. The best case in 
this type of test was achieved by setting the DCA parameters as shown in Table 18. The 
MCAV values for a sample of antigens corresponding to the top 150 are shown in Figure 
35. This diagram shows if the MCAV value of an antigen is greater than the threshold then 
it is a spam. The line in the diagram represents the threshold.  
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Table 18: Best DCA parameters values 
Approach Parameters Values AUC 
3c-DCA 
Signals weights 
  2   1   1
  2   3   1
CSM PAMP Safe Danger
K PAMP Safe Danger
     
     
 0.999 
Number of DCs 30 
Antigen multiplier 100 
 
 
 
Figure 35: Sample of top 150 antigen MCAV values  
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We also compared the proposed models with KNN, Naïve Bayes, and SVM algorithms. 
Table 19 presents the performance measures of each classifier on Spambase dataset. Figure 
36 shows the corresponding ROC for each classifier. It can be seen that both DCA-based 
models yield better results than the other classifiers. 
We performed the same experiment on the SpamAssassin dataset and the results are 
illustrated in Table 20 and Figure 37. The results show that the 2C-DCA has better AUC 
performance. 
 
 
Table 19: Performance for several classifiers on Spambase dataset 
Classifier 
Spam Ham 
Acc AUC 
PRC REC F PRC REC F 
KNN 0.773 0.780 0.776 0.856 0.851 0.853 0.823 0.815 
Naïve Bayes 0.697 0.958 0.806 0.963 0.728 0.829 0.818 0.872 
SVM 0.926 0.828 0.874 0.896 0.956 0.925 0.906 0.963 
Majority Vote 0.883 0.905 0.894 0.937 0.922 0.929 0.915 0.957 
3c-DCA 0.978 0.990 0.984 0.993 0.986 0.990 0.987 0.999 
2c-DCA 0.964 0.996 0.979 0.997 0.976 0.986 0.983 0.999 
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Figure 36: ROC performance comparison of various classifiers on Spambase dataset 
    
 
 
Table 20: Performance for several classifiers on SpamAssassin dataset 
Classifier 
Spam Ham 
Acc AUC 
PRC REC F PRC REC F 
NB 0.920 0.470 0.621 0.658 0.961 0.781 0.722 0.854 
SVM 0.961 0.529 0.681 0.689 0.981 0.809 0.762 0.917 
KNN 0.693 0.616 0.652 0.672 0.741 0.704 0.680 0.678 
Majority Vote 0.958 0.522 0.676 0.689 0.979 0.809 0.759 0.827 
3C-DCA 0.969 0.971 0.970 0.990 0.989 0.989 0.984 0.955 
2C-DCA 0.987 0.958 0.972 0.961 0.988 0.974 0.973 0.994 
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Figure 37: ROC performance comparison of various classifiers on SpamAssassin 
 
4.5 Spam Experiments (using 2c-DCA) 
This section describes 2c-DCA experiments. Moreover, the proposed features were 
leveraged in the experiments to see how effective these features are. We evaluated our 
model on four datasets: SMS big, SMS UCI, TREC2005, and SpamAssassin. We selected 
the best parameters based on AUC values. 
Not every feature presents a good indicator. Some of the features perform well whereas 
others are weak features. Hence, we measured the relevance of each feature using the Gini 
Index (GI). GI calculates the weight of each feature with respect to the message 
classification. The higher the weight of a feature, the more relevant it is considered. The 
measured weights of the features are shown in Table 21- Table 24.  
Based on the average results, SVM and NB perform better when all feature are selected as 
presented in Table 25 and Table 26. Therefore, we used all features in the DCA algorithm. 
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Table 21: Gini index weight SMS Big 
Rank Feature Weight 
1 Ind_350_Spam_Word 1 
2 Ind_17k_Spam_Word 0.984339 
3 Dep_Spam_Word 0.730443 
4 Date Tag 0.211691 
5 Function word 0.211471 
6 Organization Tag 0.109447 
7 Special characters 0.044159 
8 Location Tag 0.029989 
9 Price word (variant) 0.007501 
10 Person Tag 0.005424 
11 Gappy word 0.004595 
12 Time Tag 0.003879 
13 Money word (variant) 0.002265 
14 Money Tags  0 
15 Prescription word 
(variant) 
0 
16 Emotion Symbol 0 
 
Table 22: Gini index weight SMS UCI 
Rank Feature Weight 
1 Ind_17k_Spam_Word 1 
2 Ind_350_Spam_Word 0.979994 
3 Dep_Spam_Word 0.72005 
4 Special characters 0.248143 
5 Date Tags 0.132973 
6 Organization Tag 0.100215 
7 Function word 0.057677 
8 Location Tag 0.025524 
9 Price word (variant) 0.018329 
10 Gappy word 0.005612 
11 Time Tag 0.004049 
12 Money word (variant) 0.001331 
13 Money Tags  7.98E-04 
14 Person Tag 3.75E-04 
15 Prescription word 
(variant) 
4.05E-05 
16 Emotion Symbol 0 
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Table 23: Gini index weight SpamAssassin  
Rank Feature Weight 
1 Ind_17k_Spam_Word in body 1 
2 Ind_350_Spam_Word in body 0.951669 
3 Spam domain 0.354979 
4 Size of the message 0.327763 
5 Number of users in “CC” 
fields 
0.32356 
6 Number of characters in “To” 0.321074 
7 Ind_17k_Spam_Word in 
Subject 
0.315864 
8 Money word (variant) 0.297267 
9 Ind_350_Spam_Word in  
Subject 
0.295382 
10 Subject Capital 0.199057 
11 Number of users in “To” 0.15403 
12 Dep_Spam_Word in Subject 0.092026 
13 Function word 0.086715 
14 Prescription word (variant) 0.05069 
15 Dep_Spam_Word in body 0.046675 
16 Special characters 0.035623 
18 Blank “To” field 0.034407 
19 Subject Length 0.03149 
20 Attachment Count 0.026055 
21 Viagra word (variant) 0.025204 
22 Gappy word 0.001492 
23 JavaScript 0 
24 Cialis word (variant) 0 
 
Table 24: Gini index weight TREC2005 
Rank Feature Weight 
1 Spam domain 1 
2 Subject Length 0.374488 
3 Dep_Spam_Word in body 0.200263 
4 Special characters 0.11916 
5 Number of users in “To” 0.119149 
6 Number of characters in “To” 0.110908 
7 Money word (variant) 0.106333 
8 Size of the message 0.081175 
9 Function word 0.076451 
10 Ind_17k_Spam_Word in body 0.07319 
11 Subject Capital 0.070441 
12 Number of users in “CC” fields 0.064592 
13 Prescription word (variant) 0.062367 
14 Blank “To” field 0.051166 
15 Ind_350_Spam_Word in body 0.034282 
16 Viagra word (variant) 0.029446 
18 Cialis word (variant) 0.024818 
19 Gappy word 0.022766 
20 Dep_Spam_Word in Subject 0.018308 
21 Attachment Count 0.006854 
22 Ind_350_Spam_Word in  
Subject 
0.002628 
23 Ind_17k_Spam_Word in 
Subject 
0 
24 JavaScript 0 
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Table 25: NB Classifier 
Dataset Top two Features Top Five  Features All Features 
Spam Ham   
Acc 
  
AUC 
Spam Ham   
Acc 
  
AUC 
Spam Ham   
Acc 
  
AUC PRC REC F PRC REC F PRC REC F PRC REC F PRC REC F PRC REC F 
SMS BIG 0.901 0.945 0.922 0.982 0.966 0.974 0.959 0.988 0.859 0.952 0.902 0.984 0.948 0.965 0.948 0.988 0.786 0.955 0.861 0.984 0.915 0.948 0.924 0.973 
SMS UCI 0.734 0.902 0.809 0.984 0.949 0.966 0.943 0.973 0.785 0.901 0.838 0.984 0.962 0.973 0.954 0.966 0.602 0.926 0.729 0.988 0.904 0.944 0.907 0.961 
SpamAssassin  0.860 0.321 0.467 0.597 0.950 0.734 0.644 0.781 0.944 0.356 0.515 0.617 0.979 0.757 0.676 0.837 0.920 0.470 0.621 0.658 0.961 0.781 0.722 0.854 
TREC 1.000 0.411 0.578 0.666 1.000 0.799 0.734 0.870 0.952 0.537 0.683 0.714 0.977 0.825 0.780 0.919 0.678 0.978 0.799 0.969 0.594 0.732 0.774 0.930 
Average  0.903  0.928  0.930 
 
 
 
Table 26: SVM Classifier 
Dataset Top two Features Top Five  Features All Features 
Spam Ham   
Acc 
  
AUC 
Spam Ham   
Acc 
  
AUC 
Spam Ham   
Acc 
  
AUC PRC REC F PRC REC F PRC REC F PRC REC F PRC REC F PRC REC F 
SMS BIG 0.971 0.868 0.916 0.959 0.992 0.975 0.960 0.989 0.976 0.897 0.934 0.968 0.993 0.980 0.968 0.990 0.969 0.890 0.927 0.966 0.991 0.978 0.965 0.991 
SMS UCI 0.909 0.799 0.849 0.970 0.987 0.978 0.962 0.973 0.939 0.787 0.855 0.968 0.992 0.980 0.964 0.974 0.952 0.816 0.878 0.972 0.993 0.983 0.970 0.977 
SpamAssassin  0.816 0.543 0.651 0.672 0.883 0.763 0.718 0.799 0.956 0.550 0.697 0.697 0.976 0.813 0.769 0.884 0.961 0.529 0.681 0.689 0.981 0.809 0.762 0.917 
TREC 0.705 0.942 0.804 0.933 0.647 0.756 0.782 0.799 0.705 0.942 0.804 0.933 0.647 0.756 0.782 0.847 0.709 0.933 0.802 0.922 0.655 0.758 0.782 0.872 
Average  0.890  0.924  0.939 
 
 
 
Table 27: KNN Classifier 
Dataset Top two Features Top Five  Features All Features 
Spam Ham  
Acc 
 
AUC 
Spam Ham  
Acc 
 
AUC 
Spam Ham  
Acc 
 
AUC PRC REC F PRC REC F PRC REC F PRC REC F PRC REC F PRC REC F 
SMS BIG 0.669 0.984 0.795 0.994 0.840 0.910 0.875 0.824 0.908 0.887 0.896 0.964 0.970 0.967 0.949 0.860 0.926 0.894 0.908 0.966 0.976 0.971 0.955 0.872 
SMS UCI 0.705 0.827 0.759 0.973 0.945 0.959 0.930 0.782 0.867 0.824 0.845 0.973 0.980 0.977 0.959 0.808 0.881 0.851 0.865 0.977 0.982 0.980 0.964 0.499 
SpamAssassin  0.850 0.302 0.445 0.590 0.949 0.728 0.633 0.286 0.728 0.657 0.690 0.703 0.767 0.734 0.714 0.506 0.693 0.616 0.652 0.672 0.741 0.704 0.680 0.678 
TREC 0.461 1.000 0.631 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.452 0.500 0.696 0.859 0.765 0.853 0.666 0.740 0.756 0.571 0.712 0.649 0.677 0.723 0.775 0.746 0.720 0.714 
Average  0.598  0.686  0.691 
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4.5.1 SpamAssassin dataset 
For SpamAssassin, the classification threshold was set to a MCAV of 0.487 (we used a 
sample of the dataset that consists of 1323 spam and 1390 non-spam). In the first series of 
experiments, we changed the multiplier parameter and number of DCs. Table 28 presents 
a sample of the AUC results of the DCA performance when changing the two parameters. 
This table shows that the best AUC when agent multiplier is 100 and number of DCs is 10. 
Table 28: DCA AUC performance for SpamAssassin 
 
Antigen Multiplier 
10 30 50 70 100 
N
o
. 
o
f 
D
C
s 
10 0.8162 0.9287 0.9521 0.9573 0.9608 
30 0.7963 0.9571 0.959 0.9575 0.9593 
50 0.7417 0.9348 0.9598 0.9586 0.9588 
70 0.7136 0.9134 0.9521 0.9594 0.9579 
100 0.697 0.8955 0.944 0.9548 0.9576 
 
Other experiments were then performed by changing the signals weights. The results of 
this series are shown in Table 29. The best AUC achieved result is highlighted. We 
achieved 0.994 AUC for spam classification in this case. The best case in this type of test 
was achieved by setting the DCA parameters as shown in  
Table 30. We compared our proposed model with other machine-learning algorithms. It 
can be seen that our proposed model yields best AUC result when compared with other 
classifiers. The result of the comparison is shown in  
Table 31 and Figure 38. 
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Table 29: DCA performance for several signals weight for SpamAssassin dataset 
PAMPcsm,w PAMPk,w Safecsm,w Safek,w Dangercsm,w Dangerk,w AUC 
2 2 1 0 1 1 0.961 
2 2 1 -3 1 1 0.900 
2 1 1 -3 1 1 0.838 
2 1 1 -3 10 1 0.849 
15 1 0 -2 10 1 0.783 
2 6 2 -1 1 1 0.978 
2 2 1 -1 1 1 0.986 
2 3 1 -3 1 1 0.933 
2 10 0 -1 1 1 0.994 
2 6 2 0 1 1 0.955 
2 6 2 -2 1 1 0.975 
2 1 50 -3 40 1 0.913 
3 10 0 -1 1 30 0.972 
20 1 0 -2 10 1 0.783 
1 10 0 -1 1 1 0.995 
2 20 1 -3 1 1 0.989 
3 10 0 -1 1 50 0.867 
  
 
Table 30: Best DCA parameters value for SpamAssassin dataset 
Parameters Values 
Signals weights 
  1   0   1
  10   1   1
CSM PAMP Safe Danger
K PAMP Safe Danger
     
     
 
Number of DCs 10 
Antigen multiplier 100 
 
 
Table 31: Performance for several classifiers for SpamAssassin dataset 
Classifier 
Spam Ham 
Acc AUC 
PRC REC F PRC REC F 
NB 0.920 0.470 0.621 0.658 0.961 0.781 0.722 0.854 
SVM 0.961 0.529 0.681 0.689 0.981 0.809 0.762 0.917 
KNN 0.693 0.616 0.652 0.672 0.741 0.704 0.680 0.678 
2C-DCA 0.987 0.958 0.972 0.961 0.988 0.974 0.973 0.994 
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Figure 38: ROC for several classifiers for SpamAssassin dataset 
 
4.5.2 TREC dataset 
For TREC, the classification threshold was set to a MCAV of 0.452 (we used a sample of 
the dataset that consists of 228 spam and 276 non-spam). We performed the same series of 
experiments that were conducted in the previous section. We achieved 0.957 AUC for best 
parameters values. We compared our proposed model with other machine learning 
algorithms. The proposed model yields best AUC result when it is compared with other 
classifiers. The results are shown in Table 32 - Table 35 and the ROC is shown in Figure 
39. 
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Table 32: DCA AUC performance TREC dataset  
 
Agent Multiplier 
10 30 50 70 100 
N
o
. 
o
f 
D
C
s 
10 0.554 0.663 0.721 0.761 0.784 
30 0.558 0.754 0.793 0.800 0.799 
50 0.563 0.720 0.786 0.799 0.799 
70 0.560 0.672 0.763 0.787 0.799 
100 0.551 0.654 0.754 0.776 0.795 
 
 
 
 
Table 33: DCA performance for several signals weight for TREC dataset  
 
PAMPcsm,w PAMPk,w Safecsm,w Safek,w Dangercsm,w Dangerk,w AUC 
2 2 1 0 1 1 0.800 
2 2 1 -3 1 1 0.944 
2 1 1 -3 1 1 0.957 
2 1 1 -3 10 1 0.938 
15 1 0 -2 10 1 0.884 
2 6 2 -1 1 1 0.865 
2 2 1 -1 1 1 0.912 
2 3 1 -3 1 1 0.939 
2 10 0 -1 1 1 0.840 
2 6 2 0 1 1 0.799 
2 6 2 -2 1 1 0.891 
2 1 50 -3 40 1 0.862 
3 10 0 -1 1 30 0.790 
20 1 0 -2 10 1 0.882 
1 10 0 -1 1 1 0.784 
2 20 1 -3 1 1 0.866 
3 10 0 -1 1 50 0.790 
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Table 34: Best DCA parameters value for TREC dataset  
Parameters Values 
Signals weights 
  2   1   1
  1   3   1
CSM PAMP Safe Danger
K PAMP Safe Danger
     
    
 
Number of DCs 30 
Antigen multiplier 70 
 
 
Table 35: Performance for several classifiers for TREC dataset  
Classifier 
Spam Ham 
Acc AUC 
PRC REC F PRC REC F 
NB 0.678 0.978 0.799 0.969 0.594 0.732 0.774 0.930 
SVM 0.709 0.933 0.802 0.922 0.655 0.758 0.782 0.872 
KNN 0.712 0.649 0.677 0.723 0.775 0.746 0.720 0.714 
Proposed 0.793 0.974 0.874 0.973 0.790 0.872 0.873 0.957 
 
 
 
Figure 39: ROC for several classifiers for TREC dataset  
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4.5.3 SMS Big dataset:  
For SMS Big, the classification threshold was set to a MCAV of 0.25 (we used sample of 
the dataset that consists of 320 spam and 960 non-spam).We performed the same series of 
experiments that were conducted in the previous sections. We achieved 0.999 AUC for 
best parameters values. We compared our proposed model with other machine-learning 
algorithms. Our proposed model yields best AUC result when it is compared with other 
classifiers. The result are shown in Table 36 - Table 39 and ROC is shown in Figure 40. 
 
Table 36: DCA AUC performance for SMS Big dataset  
 
Agent Multiplier 
10 30 50 70 100 
N
o
. 
o
f 
D
C
s 
10 0.779 0.884 0.914 0.934 0.949 
30 0.782 0.930 0.952 0.954 0.955 
50 0.726 0.913 0.949 0.955 0.955 
70 0.716 0.903 0.942 0.950 0.955 
100 0.696 0.882 0.934 0.945 0.951 
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Table 37: DCA performance for several signals weight for SMS Big dataset 
PAMPcsm,w PAMPk,w Safecsm,w Safek,w Dangercsm,w Dangerk,w AUC 
2 2 1 0 1 1 0.955 
2 2 1 -3 1 1 1.000 
2 1 1 -3 1 1 1.000 
2 1 1 -3 10 1 0.995 
15 1 0 -2 10 1 0.974 
2 6 2 -1 1 1 0.998 
2 2 1 -1 1 1 1.000 
2 3 1 -3 1 1 1.000 
2 10 0 -1 1 1 0.995 
2 6 2 0 1 1 0.955 
2 6 2 -2 1 1 1.000 
2 1 50 -3 40 1 0.990 
3 10 0 -1 1 30 0.932 
20 1 0 -2 10 1 0.973 
1 10 0 -1 1 1 0.990 
2 20 1 -3 1 1 0.999 
3 10 0 -1 1 50 0.896 
 
Table 38: Best DCA parameters value for SMS Big dataset 
Parameters Values 
Signals weights 
  2   1   1
  2   3   1
CSM PAMP Safe Danger
K PAMP Safe Danger
     
     
 
Number of DCs 50 
Antigen multiplier 70 
 
Table 39: Performance for several classifiers for SMS Big dataset  
Classifier 
Spam Ham 
Acc AUC 
PRC REC F PRC REC F 
NB 0.786 0.955 0.861 0.984 0.915 0.948 0.924 0.973 
SVM 0.969 0.890 0.927 0.966 0.991 0.978 0.965 0.991 
KNN 0.926 0.894 0.908 0.966 0.976 0.971 0.955 0.872 
Proposed 0.973 1.000 0.986 1.000 0.991 0.995 0.993 0.999 
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Figure 40: ROC for several classifiers for SMS Big dataset  
 
4.5.4 SMS UCI dataset: 
For SMS UCI, the classification threshold was set to a MCAV of 0.134 (we used 747 spam 
and 4827 non-spam). We performed the same series of experiments that were conducted 
in the previous sections. We achieved 99.9 % AUC for best parameters values. We 
compared our proposed model with other machine-learning algorithms. Our proposed 
model yields best AUC result when it is compared with other classifiers. The results are 
shown in Table 40 - Table 43. The ROC is shown in Figure 41. 
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Table 40: DCA AUC performance for SMS UCI dataset  
 
Agent Multiplier 
10 30 50 70 100 
N
o
. 
o
f 
D
C
s 
10 0.672 0.858 0.909 0.933 0.946 
30 0.699 0.931 0.948 0.948 0.948 
50 0.655 0.901 0.947 0.948 0.948 
70 0.636 0.864 0.935 0.948 0.948 
100 0.617 0.821 0.932 0.940 0.947 
5   
Table 41: DCA performance for several signals weight for SMS UCI dataset  
PAMPcsm,w PAMPk,w Safecsm,w Safek,w Dangercsm,w Dangerk,w AUC 
2 2 1 0 1 1 0.948417 
2 2 1 -3 1 1 0.999999 
2 1 1 -3 1 1 0.999761 
2 1 1 -3 10 1 0.992381 
15 1 0 -2 10 1 0.961558 
2 6 2 -1 1 1 0.999422 
2 2 1 -1 1 1 0.999999 
2 3 1 -3 1 1 0.999999 
2 10 0 -1 1 1 0.999945 
2 6 2 0 1 1 0.948409 
2 6 2 -2 1 1 0.999902 
2 1 50 -3 40 1 0.990025 
3 10 0 -1 1 30 0.896799 
20 1 0 -2 10 1 0.961498 
1 10 0 -1 1 1 0.999712 
2 20 1 -3 1 1 0.999940 
3 10 0 -1 1 50 0.765086 
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Table 42: Best DCA parameters value for SMS UCI dataset  
Parameters Values 
Signals weights 
  2   1   1
  2   3   1
CSM PAMP Safe Danger
K PAMP Safe Danger
     
     
 
Number of DCs 30 
Antigen multiplier 100 
 
Table 43: Performance for several classifiers for SMS UCI dataset  
Classifier 
Spam Ham 
Acc AUC 
PRC REC F PRC REC F 
NB 0.602 0.926 0.729 0.988 0.904 0.944 0.907 0.961 
SVM 0.952 0.816 0.878 0.972 0.993 0.983 0.970 0.977 
KNN 0.881 0.851 0.865 0.977 0.982 0.980 0.964 0.903 
Proposed 0.959 1.000 0.979 1.000 0.993 0.997 0.994 0.999 
 
6  
Figure 41: ROC for several classifiers for SMS UCI dataset  
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4.6 Email Message Multi-Category Classification   
 
This section explains how to use DCA to solve the multi-category classification problem 
of email messages.  
The DCA algorithm was designed to solve binary classification problems, i.e. it classifies 
objects into two classes only. To utilize DCA for multi-category classification and achieve 
our objective, we used one-versus-all (also known as one-vs-rest) approach [71]. In this 
approach, the binary classifier is constructed to separate one class from other classes as 
shown in Figure 42.  For N classes, N binary classifiers are constructed and each binary 
classifier classifies one class as positive versus other classes as negative [84].   
 
 
Figure 42: One-versus-all 29 
  
                                                   
29 coursera.org (Machine Learning course by Stanford University) 
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For Email Message Multi-Category classification experiments, we used Enron dataset. As 
part of the dataset preprocessing, we dropped irrelevant/non-topical subfolders such as 
“deleted”, “inbox”, “trash”, and “sent”. Moreover, subcategories with a few/very large 
number of emails were dropped to have a balanced dataset. The number of folders (classes) 
for each user (dataset) is presented in Table 44. The results of our experiments produced 
accuracy more than 90% in most of the datasets as shown in Table 45 and Figure 43. 
 
Table 44: Users datasets details 
User 
No. of subfolders 
(classes) 
No. of features 
Total number  of 
email messages 
arnold-j 5 624 68 
blair-l 6 914 101 
cash-m 6 2201 108 
williams-w3 7 514 108 
sanders-r 8 1310 158 
shackleton-s 8 744 120 
lokay-m 9 3859 1328 
farmer-d 9 1520 235 
beck-s 13 908 154 
shapiro-r 13 1885 214 
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Table 45: Comparison of percentage classification accuracy per user 
No. User KNN NB SVM Proposed 
1 arnold-j 0.985 0.986 1.00 1.00 
2 blair-l 0.486 0.61 0.671 0.584 
3 cash-m 0.798 0.739 0.825 0.917 
4 williams-w3 0.860 0.724 0.907 0.907 
5 sanders-r 0.975 0.929 0.975 0.975 
6 shackleton-s 0.842 0.825 0.892 0.921 
7 lokay-m 0.363 0.669 0.202 0.519 
8 farmer-d 0.829 0.766 0.831 0.916 
9 beck-s 0.793 0.753 0.838 0.922 
10 shapiro-r 0.776 0.739 0.847 0.963 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 43: Comparison of classification accuracy per user 
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5 CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK  
5.1 Conclusion 
With the evolution of technology, hackers are levering every possible way to compromise 
the end-user’s systems including his/her mobile and computer. Email and SMS spam is 
widely spread. Cybercrimes have targeted end-user email over the past few years but 
recently they start also targeting mobile devices. The increase of hacking attempts against 
mobile phone is because of the increase in the number of mobile of devices and amount of 
data that these devices are containing. Spam becomes a serious security issue. It annoys 
the end user and wastes computing and organization resources. To overcome these issues, 
several spam filtering solutions have been proposed in the literature. The anti-spam has 
become an important control to mitigate the risk. 
This research gives a better understanding of text spam email and spam SMS filtration 
methods. In addition, it discusses email text multi-category classification (also known as 
email sorting). It explains the general architecture of the spam classifier and its main 
components and phases in a holistic approach.  We also, explain the impact of extracting 
the right features from the email or spam to significantly enhance the performance of the 
classifiers. An overview of different performance measures were provided to help selecting 
the best approach and parameters’ values. 
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This research investigates the use of dendritic cell algorithm (DCA), which was developed 
based on the reaction of the human immune system to an intruder. We provided an 
explanation of the algorithm and its application to solve several information security issues. 
We developed two models based on DCA algorithm to filter spam. The first model uses 
three classifiers (3c-DCA) to generate the required signal to operate the DCA algorithm. 
The second model, requires two classifiers (2c-DCA) to generate the signals and it needs 
less computational resources.  We evaluated our model using AUC which is widely used 
in the literature to measure the overall classifier performance. The results show that AUC 
and accuracy of the proposed model are outstanding. The proposed model is effective and 
can be easily integrated with other existing solutions that depend on machine learning 
algorithms to enhance the accuracy of the anti-spam solution. The proposed model was 
compared with widely used machine learning algorithms such as SVM, KNN and Naïve 
Bayes. The model was benchmarked on several email and SMS spam datasets.  
In addition, we proposed using several features that have been evaluated using several 
machine learning algorithms and the results yield a significant enhancement on the 
classifiers. 
We also applied the model to solve multi-classification problem (also known as email 
sorting). One-versus-all (also known as one-vs-rest) approach were used to construct the 
multi-classification model.    
The empirical results showed that our proposed model produced remarkable results.  We 
were able to achieve AUC close to 100% in most the experiments.   
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5.2 Future work 
The use of DCA to solve spam filtration and multi-category classification problem has not 
received a lot of attention in the literature. As a future work, one can: 
1. Explore using other feature extraction approaches to reduce the processing time.   
2. Investigate an automated approach to find the optimum values of DCA parameters 
to make the DCA a dynamic algorithm. Currently, the trial and error approach is 
used to identify the values of the best DCA parameters. The trial and error values 
are not easy to figure out because of the number of parameters and space. 
3. Expand the model to include spam emails with images. 
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Appendix I. Stop Words 
 
Stop words are words that are so common and often filtered out during preprocessing. But 
unfortunately, there is no definitive list of them. Hence, in our experiments, we used the 
following 395 stop words from30: 
a each needn themselves close 
abaft early needs then concerning 
aboard either neither there considering 
about em never these cos 
above english nevertheless they could 
across enough new thine couldn 
afore ere next this couldst 
aforesaid even nigh tho31 dare 
after ever nigher those dared 
again every nighest thou daren 
against everybody nisi though dares 
agin32 everyone no three daring 
ago everything one thro despite 
aint33 except nobody through did 
albeit excepting none throughout didn 
all failing nor thru different 
almost far not thyself directly 
alone few nothing till do 
along first notwithstanding to does 
alongside five now today doesn 
                                                   
30 http://rapidminernotes.blogspot.com/2015/01/english-stop-words.html  
31 slang word for "though" 
32 dialect form of against. 
33 am not; are not; is not. 
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already following er together doing 
also for of too done 
although four off touching don 
always from often toward dost 
am gonna34 on towards doth 
american gotta35 once TRUE down 
amid had oneself twas during 
amidst hadn only tween durst 
among hard onto twere let 
amongst has open twill like 
an hasn or twixt likewise 
and hast other two little 
anent hath otherwise twould living 
another have ought under long 
any haven oughtn underneath many 
anybody having our unless may 
anyone he ours unlike mayn 
anything her ourselves until me 
are here out unto mid 
aren hers outside up midst 
around herself over upon might 
as high own us mightn 
aslant him past used mine 
astride himself pending usually minus 
at his per versus more 
athwart home perhaps very most 
away how plus via much 
                                                   
34 going to. 
35 go to. 
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back howbeit possible vice must 
bar however present vis-a-vis mustn 
barring id probably wanna my 
be if provided wanting myself 
because ill providing was near 
been immediately public wasn neath36 
before important qua way need 
behind in quite we needed 
being inside rather well needing 
below instantly re were shed 
beneath into real weren shell 
beside is really wert37 short 
besides isn respecting what should 
best it right whatever shouldn 
better its round when since 
between itself same whencesoever six 
betwixt ve sans whenever small 
beyond just save whereas so 
both large saving where some 
but last second whether somebody 
by later several which someone 
can least shall whichever something 
cannot left shalt whichsoever sometimes 
certain less shan while soon 
circa lest she whilst special 
who whosoever wouldst yourselves that 
whoever will ye still the 
                                                   
36 beneath. 
37 the imperfect subjunctive of "were" found in Shakespearean English. 
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whole with yet such thee 
whom within you summat38 their 
whore without your supposing theirs 
whose wont yours sure them 
whoso would yourself than wouldn 
 
  
                                                   
38 Yorkshire dialect for "something" 
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